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This thesis proposes a model-based systems engineering approach to ship design for the 
purpose of improving the Navy’s ship design processes.  It links capability needs to the 
end solution by utilizing system architecture development based on capability 
requirements to allow for enhanced traceability, verification, and validation throughout 
the design process.  Modeling tools are used to explore mission effectiveness against 
projected threats and create a design space for weighing tradeoffs early in the conceptual 
design phase. 
 For demonstration of this approach, a simple design reference mission is created 
and a functional architecture is described.  The capability of a potential design solution 
(assumed to have the physical architecture of a ship) is modeled to evaluate logical 
behavior and mission effectiveness. These models aid in the formation of physical design 
specifications, which are incorporated as inputs to a ship synthesis model. Several 
alternatives can be created for comparison that reveals the costs associated with various 
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This thesis examines ship design that incorporates system architecture 
development and model-based systems engineering (MBSE); it features a method of 
moving from desired capabilities needs set by the U.S. Navy and working towards the 
design of a ship.  This top-down ship design perspective examines a design space, 
specifically the tradeoffs between mission effectiveness and ship performance and cost. 
The initial capability needs of this ship design process are translated to 
requirements and incorporated into a design reference mission (DRM) upon which 
further design decisions are based.  The DRM includes a description of the missions that 
the system will be expected to perform, how mission effectiveness will be measured, and 
how well the system should perform in the missions. 
With capabilities and a DRM documented, the ship’s functional architecture can 
be created.  The requirements are allocated to functions (in the form of verb statements) 
that the ship will perform.  Each of those functions is decomposed into sub-functions to 
create a functional architecture as a hierarchy for the entire ship.  Functional allocation, 
mapping general physical components to each of the functions in the hierarchy, is done to 
makes up the ship physical architecture.  Specific criteria for the elements (components) 
of the physical architecture are determined through the coupled mapping of mission 
effectiveness and ship synthesis modeling. 
Once the ship is described in terms of requirements, functions and physical 
components, a behavioral model is created to describe how the ship will act in a 
particular scenario, such as anti-submarine warfare (ASW), Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), 
anti-surface warfare (ASuW), etc.  For this thesis, the scenario used to demonstrate a 
behavioral model is AAW.  The AAW behavioral model shows how the ship will 
respond in terms of functions that will be performed, the sequence in which they will be 
performed, as well as, triggers, inputs, and outputs.  As in all mission areas, there are 
many variables that determine the exact course of action taken by a system.  These 
possibilities are all displayed in the behavioral model as logic gates and symbols.  
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Verification is performed on the model through a resource-monitoring simulation.  To 
demonstrate this verification, the limited resource in question is the time it takes for a 
scenario to run and the duration of functions.  The scenario time is determined by the 
time it takes a missile to reach the ship from the point it was launched.  All necessary 
functions must perform their tasks in sequence within that finite time. 
After it is established how the ship will act in a scenario then the quality of 
performance can be designed by selecting the individual system physical component.  A 
discrete event simulation (DES) model is created based on the behavioral model and the 
physical architecture.  Quantitative measures of effectiveness (MOE) are used to describe 
how well the ship performs in an AAW scenario.  With variable input parameters 
included in the model, optimal design criteria can be determined.  In this AAW scenario, 
the radar detection range will be varied in the simulation to determine which range 
returns the desired MOE outcome.  That desired radar detection range then becomes a 
design criterion for the combat system of the ship.  When designing the ship layout and 
characteristics, a radar system will be selected that meets the radar range criterion. 
For this thesis, a ship synthesis model is used that accounts for the radar system 
parameters (i.e., weight and power usage) as a function of desired radar detection range.  
The characteristics of a reference ship of similar mission and approximate size are used 
as a starting point for synthesis.  Other input values to the synthesis model correlate to 
requirements through the physical and functional architectures.  The output is a list of 
various characteristics of the ship such as dimensions, weight, combat systems suite, and 
cost. 
The ultimate goal of this work is to provide an example of a design trade space 
that reflects the cost of performance in terms of a single mission area, in this case AAW 
mission effectiveness.  The trade space will provide decision-makers with options and 
information with which they can make thoughtful decisions.  Furthermore, this approach 
can be generalized to any mission area to allow for traceability between all stages of 
design back to the initial DRM and system capability needs. 
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A. BACKGROUND 
A naval surface combatant ship is a very complex system from an engineering 
design perspective.  Challenges in this field are numerous.  These challenges are present 
in the form of financial and technological issues, not to mention that creation of the right 
design solution for an uncertain future threat environment is a difficult task.  For classes 
of ships designed for two or three decade service lives, there is risk that the projected 
threat environment will change within that time.  With the goal of reducing cost and 
project lead-time and ensuring delivery of capabilities-appropriate design solutions, the 
Navy is in constant search of ways to improve the outcomes. 
The United States has been in the business of ship design since the country was 
just starting out.  By way of the Naval Act of 1794, the U.S. Navy came to life with the 
construction of six frigates.  In those days, shipbuilders were government employees.  As 
time went on, technology improved and potential threats to the nation and its interests 
relied increasingly on a strong naval force.  In 1866, the Navy established a Construction 
Corps of Naval Officers who would receive specialized training and education in the field 
of ship design and construction.  Just before World War II, the Construction Corps was 
completely disbanded, which put warship design into the hands of civilian naval 
architects who were employed by the Naval Sea Systems Command (Ferreiro, 1998).  
Since then, building new warships became not only the business of the government but 
also a market for industry. 
Constant evolution of the fleet is necessary to keep up with the ever-changing 
threat environment.  The long history of naval ship design has lead to a paradigm in 
which technological complexity is an inevitable necessity to achieve suitability in the 
world’s maritime theaters of today and tomorrow.  Both cost and effectiveness measures 




The existing process for designing ships in United States Department of the Navy 
has a recent record that shows the design process tends to take longer than expected and 
more money than planned while allowing for compromised performance and shortfalls in 
capabilities (Fox, 2011).  Design teams for projects as large as a new naval surface 
combatant are split up into groups within groups of engineers, managers, analysts, and 
government or military representative overseers.  The workload is then divided among 
the major groups to accomplish the task of designing a ship in pieces.  One major group 
is responsible for designing the hull, mechanical, and electrical systems (HM&E). 
Another major group is tasked with design of the combat systems (or mission systems).  
While this approach of divide and conquer may seem to be the most intuitive, the 
complex nature of naval combatants requires early and frequent considerations for 
integration, which is not an easy task for independent groups.  Traceability of system 
requirements, limitations, and constraints are not clear between the work projects of all 
design groups.  Thus, inevitably, as the pieces are brought together, they do not fit 
perfectly and compromises have to be made, yielding a less than ideal design solution. 
MBSE tools such as CORE provide for identification and mapping of interfaces, 
mapping of needs to requirements to solutions, and provide a cohesive and consistent 
system model upon which to base the design process. 
2. Validation 
Validation is making sure that the system being designed is the right solution for 
the needs of the stakeholders.  When the operating environment of the system is 
projected, the ability of the system to combat future threats can be simulated.  Modeling 
and simulation tools such as ExtendSim and CORESim aid in the exploration of 
performance parameters necessary to satisfy the capability needs, which link the 
capability needs to the end solution. 
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis follows the work of three studies into the ship design process.  Welch 
(2011) examined a method to supplement current combatant ship synthesis tools with 
combat system equipment and war fighting capability parameters.  This method laid the 
groundwork for creating an improved ship synthesis tool that includes complete 
sensitivity to capabilities from all combat systems on the ship and how these selected 
parameters impact mission performance in a large spectrum of warfare areas. 
Fox (2011) developed a methodology for the design of a warship that is capable 
of showing how naval architecture related decisions interact with operations measures of 
effectiveness through the use of modeling and simulation.  With this method, decision 
makers can assess various system outcomes by trading off performance parameters to 
make capability-based decisions. 
The work done by Szatkowski (2000) proposed a methodology based on 
axiomatic design principles to eliminate the currently accepted iterative nature of concept 
level ship design.  He studied the design at each level of the hierarchy to determine the 
logical order to fulfill each requirement such that these couplings do not adversely impact 
the design progression.  By implementing this methodical approach, the ship design 
process followed a repeatable structured format in which functional relationships between 
physical parameters are mapped, documented, and controlled. 
The work done in this thesis will link together the architecture development 
method from Szatkowski with the tradeoff analysis of Welch and Fox. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The need for meeting future naval capabilities that result in appropriate system 
solutions necessitates a long and expensive process of engineering and test and 
evaluation.  This thesis attempts to discover how a structured model-based approach can 
provide a consistent basis for connecting capability need to the end solution. Further, it 
asks, “How can a ship be designed effectively in terms of performance and effectiveness  
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related to mission capabilities? In what ways can modeling tools promote the creation of 
the right design solution in terms of performance and effectiveness related to mission 
capabilities?” 
MBSE is a method in which system-level models are used to simulate functions 
and evaluate capabilities: in Sala-Diakanda (2004) MBSE is described as “the formalized 
application of modeling to support systems requirements, design, analysis, verification, 
and validation activities beginning in the conceptual design phase and continuing 
throughout development and later life cycle phases.”  With this definition in mind, this 
research seeks to uncover how MBSE can be used to enhance traceability throughout a 
combatant ship design process to produce a valid trade-space for decision-makers.  
MBSE will be used to demonstrate how the quantitative results of a tradeoff between ship 
characteristics, such as displacement and cost, and mission effectiveness can be used to 
reason about the engineering possibilities involved. 
D. MODEL-BASED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH 
This thesis is a MBSE approach to ship design because it centralizes computer 
models for the major steps in the systems engineering process.  As stated by Estefan 
(2007), “model-based engineering is about elevating models in the engineering process to 
a central and governing role in the specification, design, integration, validation, and 
operation of a system.”  
This thesis uses the term “system” as a placeholder for a solution to the need.  As 
described in ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010 (http://www.iso-architecture.org/ieee-1471/faq.html), 
an international standard for development of system architecture descriptions, a system 
could refer to an enterprise, a system of systems, a product line, a service, a subsystem, or 
software.  All systems have architectures whether they are documented or not as they are 
the conception of a system.  The Standard defines architecture this way: “fundamental 
concepts or properties of a system in its environment embodied in its elements, 
relationships, and in the principles of its design.”  The purpose of developing an 
architecture description is to aid in the understanding, analysis, and comparison of 
systems as well as determine the system’s form, function, value, cost, and risk.  Figure 1 
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captures key terms and concepts of systems and their architectures.  The various 
relationships between the architecture model, system, stakeholders, and environment are 
illustrated. 
 
Figure 1.   System Relationships Diagram 
A process model is used to guide the analysis, design, development, and 
maintenance of systems.  There are many methods and techniques used to direct the life 
cycle of a system development project.  Most real-world models are customized 
adaptations of generic models (Center for Technology in Government, 1998).  Figure 2 
shows a developmental process model commonly used in systems engineering.  Each step 
includes a degree of iteration and checking for validation and verification.  A MBSE 
approach might follow a general process model much like this, however, each activity 
will be accomplished through the development of models, and the iterations of which will 
be of increasing detail and accuracy. 
Using the “Vee” model as an example, Figure 2, the first process activity is 
“Understand user requirements, develop system concept, and validation plan.” For 




and simulation tool, ExtendSim.  The second block in the “Vee” model is “develop 
system performance specifications.” The modeling program ExtendSim and CORE will 
be used to perform this activity. 
 
Figure 2.   Systems Engineering Process Model (From Estefan, 2007) 
E. METHOD 
The steps that make up this method allow for multiple iterations and various 
outcomes on which to base a design space for exploration allowing decision-makers to 
select a preferred solution based on design, performance, and cost.  The method 
incorporates detailed traceability throughout all steps, which makes early-and-often 
validation and verification apparent. 
The products of the major steps of this method are to create a DRM, functional 
architecture, and physical architecture; to conduct behavioral modeling and effectiveness 
modeling, and to accomplish finally the synthesis of a ship.  As each product is being 
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developed the previous step(s) could be affected. This is primarily a recipe that depends 
on a great deal of re-evaluation of past products and iteration for validation and 
verification. 
To form a MBSE approach, modeling and simulation tools are used to create the 
products.  The modeling environment software, CORE, is used to develop the functional 
and physical architecture of the combatant ship and to simulate and verify the ships 
behavior in scenarios.  The DES modeling software, ExtendSim, is used to evaluate the 
system’s performance and effectiveness for particular threat scenarios.  Ship synthesis is 
conducted within an Excel model.  Together, these tools will enhance validation and 
traceability of system requirements throughout the process of designing a complex 
surface combatant. 
This thesis offers a small-scale demonstration of all these complex system design 
steps using simple example scenarios and parameters.  For example, focus will be applied 
to only one major combatant mission area—AAW, and is evaluated based on a single 
measure of effectiveness (MOE)—the probability of survival in a missile threat scenario.  
The method scales up to more authentic ship designs. 
F.  SCOPE OF THIS THESIS 
The scope of this thesis is primarily intended to demonstrate a proposed method 
for accomplishing the task of designing a ship and presenting alternatives for analysis in a 
trade-space.  The models used for this demonstration are straightforward so as not to 
convolute the intent of this study.  In a real-world naval combatant design project, the 
models would be replaced with more detailed ones, though the tools—particularly 
Extendsim and Vitech CORE—could be used in real-world combatant ship design 
projects.  Any recommendations made from this thesis will refer to the methodology and 
use of modeling and simulation rather than to the analysis of the example model itself. 
G. BENEFITS OF THIS STUDY 
The intent of this thesis is to demonstrate a method and evaluation that might 
offer new insights into how MBSE can be used to improve the combatant ship design 
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process.  Through demonstration of a process in which alternative conceptual combatant 
designs can be created with a greater degree of traceability from the top down and 
analyzed for trade-space considerations, the foundation for incorporating MBSE in 
combatant ship design is demonstrated. 
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II. DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION 
The DRM defines the projected threat and operating environment upon which a 
rigorous systems engineering process can be based.  The intent of a DRM is to ensure 
that the system being developed will meet the Navy’s needs.  Following the guidance of 
Skolnick and Wilkins (2000), a DRM is presented in the form of “specific operationally 
representative situations and supporting threat and physical environment 
characterizations.” The operational situations (OPSIT) are intended to describe 
operational characteristics of the system in a combat environment for which it is to be 
designed. 
When DRMs are created for application in a real world project, inputs and 
reviews are taken from the communities that would use the system as well as the 
acquisitions and intelligence communities.  Stakeholder input is essential to ensuring 
valid, realistic, useful solutions (Skolnick & Wilkins, 2000).  For the purposes of this 
thesis analysis, all threat and mission information is notional. 
A. ANTI-AIR WARFARE MISSIONS 
AAW is a major mission area of surface navies.  This thesis focuses on AAW 
because the mission lends itself nicely to straightforward implementation using DES 
modeling, and the author has professional and academic experience on the subject.  It 
encompasses the tasks to search, detect, track, classify, and neutralize hostile airborne 
targets.  A battle group working together or an independent ship could perform these 
tasks.  Many integrated systems are involved in carrying them out.  Ship borne systems 
such as three-dimensional air search radars (e.g., SPY-1) and electronic signal detectors 
(e.g., SLQ-32) are used to detect and detect airborne contacts.  Additionally, the Navy 
has many surface-to-air weapons and counter measures to use to neutralize airborne 
threats.   
The targets in an AAW scenario are either Air-to-Surface Missiles (ASM) or 
enemy aircraft.  Targets can be neutralized in two general forms.  The first is what is 
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known as a “hard kill” where the airborne target is physically destroyed.  Hard kills are 
achieved by hitting the target with a missile or gun system (e.g., SM-2 or CIWS).  A “soft 
kill” is when the missile or aircraft is prevented from hitting the ship by methods other 
than destruction.  Soft kills can be achieved through the use of electronic 
countermeasures, such as chaff or active jamming.   
B. OPERATIONAL SITUATION 
The context in which AAW is applied is simplified for the purposes of clear 
demonstration of the method in this thesis.  The ship operates independently with its one 
sensor, air search radar, to detect an in-bound enemy aircraft that releases a single ASM.  
The goal of the ship is to detect the aircraft and/or the missile.  The only methods for kill 
in this simplified scenario is hard kill via surface to air missile (SAM) or Close in 
Weapon System (CIWS).  If the ship only detects and classifies an enemy aircraft it will 
try for a hard kill.  However, if the ship detects both aircraft and ASM it will engage only 
the ASM because it is assumed that the enemy aircraft will retreat once it has released its 
weapon. 
1. Mission Profile  
This notional scenario is intended to be simplistic yet feasible for a real world 
engagement.  Within ten years from now hostilities arise between the U.S. and an 
unspecified adversary.  The Navy has requested that an asset be positioned off the 
western coast of the Korean Peninsula in the Yellow Sea.  Analysis of collected 
intelligence has determined that an airborne attack on any U.S. asset in the area is 
imminent.  It is assumed that the Fleet Rules of Engagement allow a commanding officer 
to defend his or her ship and crew from any attack without waiting for approval.  As the 
date and time of the attack are anticipated, the ship makes all preparations for battle.  The 
general quarters watch stations are manned; in other words, the asset and its crew will be 
at its most heightened state of readiness.  The commanding officer has issued a 
preemptive order to immediately engage any target classified as enemy so that maximum 
time is allowed for SAM to travel. 
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2. Threat Characterization 
The ASM missile in this mission profile has characteristics resembling those of 
the French-made Exocet anti-ship missile (AM-39).  Figure 3 shows an Exocet missile 
fixed to a French-made Dassault Rafale fighter aircraft.   
 
 
Figure 3.   Exocet AM39 (Photo by D. Monniaux, from Wikipedia) 
 










Length 4.69 m 
Diameter 0.35 m 
Wingspan 1.1 m 
Launch Weight 670 kg 
Payload 165 kg HE, fragmentation 
Propulsion Solid 
Range 50-70 km 
Guidance INS, active radar 
In service 1979-Present 
Exported Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Greece, India, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Pakistan, 
Peru, Qatar, Saudia Arabia, Singapore, 
South Africa, UAE, Venezuela 
 
The threat aircraft used to deploy the ASM is similar to the Dassault Rafale, as 




Figure 4.   Dassault Rafale Multirole Fighter  
(From French Defense Ministry Website) 
3. Physical Environment 
The mission profile in this DRM takes place in the Yellow Sea.  The area has a 
large amount of fishing and commercial shipping traffic.  Commercial air traffic is 
moderate in the airspace over the Yellow Sea.  The area has very cold winters with 
monsoons.  Summers are rainy and warm with frequent typhoons.  Fog is very common 
along the coasts and the water depth is very shallow on average, approximately 44 
meters. 
C. MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS 
A MOE is, as stated in the Defense Acquisition University Glossary, a measure 
designed to correspond to accomplishment of mission objectives and achievement of 
desired results.  An MOE can be mapped to MOPs. 
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The Universal Naval Task List (UNTL) includes measures and criteria that the 
Navy uses to assess the tasks performed by naval assets (CNO, CMC, & HUSCG, 2007).  
Task number 3.2.7, “Intercept, Engage, and Neutralize Enemy Aircraft and Missile 
Targets (Defensive Counter Air),” has three measures of performance.  Table 2 shows the 
MOPs listed for this task.   
Table 2.   UNTL Task 3.2.7 Measures of Performance 
Index Form Measure Description 
M1 Number COA denied to enemy due to friendly interdiction 
M2 Percent Of enemy targets engaged. 
M3 Percent Of targets attacked with desired effects. 
 
While the task 3.2.7 MOPs would provide valid evaluation of an offensive task, 
the mission profile in this thesis describes a countertargeting situation.  The task 
description of task number 3.1.7 is “Employ countertargeting tactics when either the 
tactical situation warrants or when indications and warnings (I&W) indicate an attack is 
imminent.  I&W must permit sufficient time to put countertargeting assets in place.” The 
measures of this task are listed in Table 3 (CNO et al., 2007).   
Table 3.   UNTL Task 3.1.7 Measures 
Index Form Measure Description 
M1 Percent Of units successfully countertargeted. 
M2 Time To initiate countertargeting 
M3 Percent Of casualties sustained after countertargeting initiated. 
 
The MOE in this mission profile is the survivability of the ship.  The MOP that 
will help determine the MOE is the probability of survival against the ASM threat.  Task 
3.1.7 M3 (percent of casualties sustained after countertargeting initiated) is how the 
performance of the ship will be evaluated for this DRM and will be stated as the 
probability of survival (PS). 
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D. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
The customer, user, and primary stakeholder for this demonstrative design project 
are the U.S. Navy.  The process for determining and selecting a physical architecture 
alternative for which to explore mission effectiveness is to perform a capabilities-based 
analysis to determine capability gaps. Then, do a solution neutral simulation of mission 
needs, use it for the functional system architecture description and determine the 
functional specifications necessary to accomplish the mission.  Physical architectures of 
various solutions will be mapped to the functions.  For this thesis, it is assumed that the 
physical architecture of “ship” is best.  Therefore, the alternatives created for comparison 
will all be ships. 
For this thesis a fictional need and capability gap will be evaluated based on the 
assumption that a maritime asset, namely a surface combatant ship, may be a feasible 
solution.  In this mission profile, the country wants presence of military power in the 
Yellow Sea area to deter the adversary from performing any hostile acts against the 
United States and its allies. 
It is further assumed that at this time a platform that can support this mission in 
that particular environment does not exist.  The specific capability gap that prevents an 
existing system from performing this mission lies in the AAW mission area and sustained 
independent operation in littoral waters.  The fictional capability gap used for 
demonstration in this thesis is the ability for the future conceptual ship to defend itself 
from enemy airborne attack. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter established the missions that the ship will be expected to perform, 
the expected environment of operation, the threats, and the MOEs.  It is assumed that a 
feasible alternative to meet future defense needs is a ship that can operate independently 
in a shallow area where it will likely not be resupplied for up to a month, and there is risk 
of enemy attack with ASMs.  All subsequent design decisions will be traced back to this 
DRM. 
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III. ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT 
This approach to model based systems engineering for combatant ship design 
utilizes one modeling tool for architecture development. A comprehensive integrated 
modeling environment within the software program, Vitech CORE, has many features 
that are useful for engineering a complex system.  These features include, but are not 
limited to, requirements management, behavior analysis, architecture development, and 
validation and verification. 
This tool along with a ship synthesis model provides complete end-to-end 
traceability.  Capability needs and requirements delineated by the Navy are traced to the 
functional architecture, then mapped to a physical architecture.  The specific 
characteristics of the physical components can be manipulated within the realm of 
feasibility to satisfy operational effectiveness requirements, which are then implemented 
in ship design alternatives. 
A. FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY 
The functional architecture of a surface combatant describes what the system 
needs to do, as opposed to how it will do it, in order to satisfactorily perform as intended.  
This description is phrased in terms that leave the solution undetermined, otherwise 
referred to as solution independent, so that engineers are not limited by or aiming for a 
predetermined design (aside from the assumed constraint that the solution will be a ship).  
The architecture is built from the top down or in other words starting from the top-level 
essential functions, which are decomposed by sub-functions. 
The combatant functional architecture used in this thesis follows the work of John 
Szatowski (2000), which analyzes the functional hierarchical decomposition of a naval 
surface combatant based on functional requirements, which are mapped into physical 
design parameters.  This functional architecture includes six top-level functions that are 
the requirements common to all seagoing vessels as well as those relevant only to 
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warships.  These top-level functions, as modeled in CORE, are displayed in Figure 5 as a 
decomposition of the system level requirement “Perform Surface Combatant Missions.”  
 
 
Figure 5.   Top-level Functions of a Surface Combatant 
Each top-level function is then decomposed into levels of sub-functions.  The 
functional hierarchy is comprised of all solution independent verb statements to indicate 
the actual actions that take place to satisfy the function they are decomposing.  The sub-
function numbers are referenced to their parent functions and are not indicators of 
execution order or importance.  Figure 6 is an example of the second-level decomposition 
of a top-level function.  The remaining second-level functional hierarchies are included in 




Figure 6.   Second-level Functional Decomposition of Function 3 
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B. PHYSICAL HIERARCHY 
Each element of the functional hierarchy is allocated to a physical component.  
These components will comprise a hierarchal decomposition that mirrors that of the 
functional architecture.  Table 4 shows the top-level functions and the physical 
components to which they are allocated.  This thesis follows Szatkowski in that a one-to-
one allocation design was used.  That is, each function is allocated to exactly one 
component.  The numbering scheme for the functional hierarchy and the physical 
components are identical.  This method clearly illustrates traceability between the two 
architectures, which is a primary objective of this thesis.  
Table 4.   Top-level Functions Mapped to Components 
Number Function Component 
0 Perform Surface Combatant Missions  Ship 
1 Move through water  Propulsion system  
2 Maintain desired course  Maneuvering and control system 
3 Neutralize enemy targets  Combat systems configuration  
4 Protect from enemy attack  Countermeasures methods  
5 Conduct sustained underway operations  Support/Auxiliary systems  
6 Operate on surface of water  Hull form  
 
In some cases, typically for the higher levels of the hierarchy, the physical 
component is an entire subsystem.  To allow designers flexibility and to maintain a 
degree of solution independence, the component descriptions are kept very general.  They 
may provide an example system that performs the allocated function but they do not 
indicate placement, quantity, or specific characteristics.  Mission effectiveness modeling 
and ship synthesis modeling will determine those details.  As in the case of the function 
“Neutralize long range airborne weapons,” the allocated component is “Long range 
surface to air missile system” with the example system provided, NATO Sea Sparrow. 
A complete table of the entire mapped functional and physical hierarchies is 
included in Appendix B. 
 22
C. BEHAVIORAL MODEL 
Behavioral models are used to describe possible patterns of behavior for the 
system.  System architects use behavioral models to illustrate complex system 
relationships and dynamic possibilities so that clients and builders can understand the 
relationships between functional elements and likewise between physical elements.  
Because behavioral models are meant to show a system’s behavioral processes, the level 
of detail in a model is determined by what a client will likely be able to understand.  In 
this case, the functional blocks chosen correspond to the level of detail with which naval 
personnel are familiar. 
1. Enhanced Functional Flow Block Diagram 
The behavioral model used in this thesis is an Enhanced Functional Flow Block 
Diagram (EFFBD).  It provides a basis for establishing multi-layered processes with 
sequential, parallel, repetitive, and decision logic used show how the system behaves 
(Vitech Corporation, 2011).  Threads illustrate a system’s functional response in a 
particular event.  For a surface combatant, an anti-submarine warfare scenario might 
begin with the detection of a target followed by classification and engagement. 
Each function block in the EFFBD can have associated attributes such as inputs, 
outputs, triggers, resource utilization, and time durations.  These input, output, and trigger 
attributes further describe the interaction between function blocks and show the client 
how the system works. 
Resource utilization and time duration attributes help the engineers to determine 
feasibility and limitations of the system.  For example, in this EFFBD, an incoming ASM 
has a velocity and a detection range, which translates to a finite and predictable time to 
impact.  If the components allocated to the functions in this scenario cannot perform their 
tasks within that time limit, then the system will be ineffective.  A stochastic operational 
model using estimated system performance, probabilistic responses, and a randomized 
item generation enhances the warfare effectiveness study.  This thesis utilizes a modeling 
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tool called ExtendSim to trace the functional and physical architecture to mission 
effectiveness, which is discussed in the section titled “Mission Effectiveness.” 
2. Anti-Air Warfare Scenario 
The scenario modeled throughout this thesis is an AAW scenario.  The surface 
combatant of this project has functions that allow it to detect, classify, and engage 
airborne targets.  Action options are presented to the systems in the form of OR-gates, 
AND-gates, loops, and iterations.  Specific scenario parameters are what determine which 
response the system will take.  The EFFBD does not include every possible outcome; 
rather it demonstrates the logic flow of the function blocks. 
In this model, an airborne target is detected and then it is classified as either an 
enemy aircraft or an ASM.  If it is an enemy aircraft, the missile launch system will be 
activated and a missile will be launched.  The launch will trigger the system to track and 
guide the missile to the target.  If, at that time, the aircraft is still flying inbound, the 
system will complete the loop: otherwise, the scenario is over.  In the case where the 
system initially detects an inbound ASM, one of three weapon systems will be chosen, 
depending on the ASM range.  The weapon system selection and engagement will loop 
continuously until the ASM is killed or the ship is hit, at which time the scenario is over. 
3. Anti-Air Warfare Enhanced Functional Flow Block Diagram 
The functional blocks used to demonstrate how the system operates in this 
scenario were chosen based on what a person in the Navy would understand.  For 
example, the first block was chosen to be “Detect airborne targets” rather than the 
functional blocks it is decomposed by, “Switch between transmit/receive, 
“Transmit/receive EM pulse,” and “Process EM data” because the words “Detect 
airborne targets” is the level of rigor with which the action is commonly associated. 
Figure 7 shows the portion of the AAW EFFBD that depicts the system options 
once an enemy aircraft has been detected.  This EFFBD diagram shown is a product of 
the modeling software, CORE, by Vitech.  The blocks are each labeled with their unique 
numerical identifier, the function in the form of a verb statement, and the allocated 
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physical component.  Functional flow logic is depicted by circled words or abbreviations 
such as “OR,” “AND,” “LP,” and “EXIT.” The word “OR” serves as an exclusive OR-
gate where exactly one branch will be executed.  The branches following a circled 
“AND” are parallel actions which, will all be executed. “AND,” “OR,” and “LOOP” 
logic streams will repeat the circled word at the end of the set of function blocks.  An 
“EXIT” represents a scenario termination.   
As shown in Figure 7, the function stream begins with “Detect airborne target” 
and then a circled “OR” splits the stream into two branches.  The top branch represents 
the case when the detected target is only an aircraft and the lower branch is for when an 
ASM is detected.  In this scenario, if an enemy aircraft is inbound it is assumed that it is 
entering a range in which an ASM can be deployed.  The purpose of the top branch is to 
kill the aircraft before it has the opportunity to drop a weapon.  The aircraft will not be 
engaged if it has already dropped its weapon, rather the ship will begin to engage the 
inbound ASM.  Following detection of only an aircraft, it will be classified electronically, 








Figure 7.   AAW EFFBD (Only Aircraft Detected)
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Upon completion of an enemy classification (as illustrated in Figure 8) the ship 
will activate its launching system, then wait for the aircraft to enter the maximum 
standard missile (SM) firing range, which is when the “aircraft kill loop” begins.  The 
first function that is included in the kill loop is “Launch Missile.” From this function, a 
circled “AND” represents the parallel functions: “Guide missile to target” and “Track 
missile’s flight path,” which both occur simultaneously.  As the ship tracks the missile’s 
flight path, there are three possible options.  The first is that the aircraft was not killed, it 
is still in firing range, and an ASM was not deployed.  The second option is that the 
aircraft was not killed; however, it did drop an ASM, for this case the aircraft kill loop 
will be exited so that the ship can begin prosecuting the ASM.  The third option after the 
launch of the first SM is when the aircraft was killed and the scenario is ended. 
A complete illustration of the “Only aircraft detected” branch and the “ASM 




Figure 8.   AAW EFFBD (Aircraft kill loop)
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The second branch exiting from the first function, “Detect airborne targets,” is to 
cover the instance when the target detected is an ASM.  The exclusive OR-gate comes 
immediately after the detection of target rather than after the classification function box 
because the 3D air search radar system can make the determination of aircraft or missile 
based on velocity and trajectory.  The classification function is intended to determine 
whether the detected aircraft is an enemy or a friendly force.  The “ASM detected” 
branch needs no similar friend or foe classification function because all high speed 
inbound missiles will be assumed a threat and prosecuted.  Figure 9 shows the branch 
split following the detection of an airborne target.  Once an ASM is detected, the ship 
enters the ASM kill loop where it will determine if the ASM is inside the engagement 
window. 
 
Figure 9.   AAW EFFBD (ASM Detected) 
Inside the ASM kill loop the ship is presented with three options of an exclusive 
OR-gate.  Depending on the range of the ASM for a particular iteration of the loop, the 
ship can utilize its weapon system that is intended to neutralize long, medium, or short-
range airborne targets.  The corresponding sample physical systems for these functions 
are the NATO Sea Sparrow Missile (NSSM), the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM), and 
the Close In Weapon System (CIWS), respectively.  Figure 10 shows the first two 
selection possibilities, long-range and medium-range weapon systems.  Both options 
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include functions for activating the weapon system, launching missiles, tracking, and 
guiding the missile to the target.  At the end of each option, a kill evaluation is made that 
determines whether the ASM kill loop is repeated or if the scenario is ended, denoted by 
a circled “EXIT.”  When a kill evaluation determines that the ASM was not killed and the 
loop must be repeated, the ship will be presented with the option of weapon systems 
again depending on the new ASM range. 
Figure 11 shows the third weapon system option.  The function “neutralize short-
range airborne targets” (such as CIWS) will be selected if the ASM range is within the 
engagement window.  This branch represents the last line of defense for the ship.  Three 
outcomes are possible once the ASM is engaged by the CIWS.  The first possible 
outcome is the ASM is not killed and the target is still inside the engagement window so 
it will continue the ASM kill loop.  The second outcome is that the ASM is killed and the 
scenario is over.  The third possible outcome is the case when the ASM is not killed and 
it is no longer inside the engagement window, meaning the ship has been hit and the 












Figure 11.   AAW EFFBD (ASM kill loop) Part 2 
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D.  BEHAVIORAL MODEL VERIFICATION  
Vitech’s Modeling environment software, CORE, includes a feature called 
COREsim, which is a dynamic verification simulator.  The defined system has fit into a 
behavioral model to show how the system is supposed to react in a specific scenario.  To 
verify that the behavior expected is feasible, the model is run through simulations.  
COREsim provides automatic dynamic verification of the functional behavior model 
(Vitech Corporation, 2011). 
Logic is verified to make sure that functions occur in the sequence they are 
supposed to.  Doing this can identify inconsistencies as well as system limitations.  For 
example, a time duration attribute can be assigned to each function block based on the 
estimated time needed for the respective allocated physical components to complete the 
tasks of the scenario.  The scenario will dictate the time limit for the sum of the functions 
to complete the tasks.  As time is the ratio of speed to distance, the time limit for an 
AAW scenario is determined by the velocity and initial range of the incoming ASM. 
COREsim generates a timeline for each simulation that displays when functions 
are begun, how long they wait for a trigger, the time it takes to perform, and which 
branches were used.  For demonstration purposes, arbitrary probabilities were assigned to 
each of the branches so that all of the function threads could be simulated. 
Probabilities were used to assign branch determination logic based on the range of 
the incoming ASM and the range limitations of the four surface-to-air weapon systems on 
the ship.  The simulation clock begins when the missile is at the assumed initial detection 
range, assumed to be a distance of 185 km.  In reality, detection range of the air search 
radar system is determined by a plethora of variables, which can be characterized by a 
probability distribution function specific to the type of radar system and the missile 
threat.  However, for concept demonstration in this two dimensional AAW scenario, a 
single estimated value was used for the input parameters that effect the function durations 
and branch selection logic.  Those parameters are listed in Table 5 (Drennan, 1994) and 
(Integrated Publishing, 2007). 
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Table 5.   Fixed System Parameters 
System Parameter Value Units 
Air Search Radar 
  Detection Range 185 Km 
  Processing Time 1 Seconds 
ASM 
  Velocity 0.3 Km/sec 
Surface to Air Weapon System 
  SM Velocity 1 Km/sec 
  VLS Activation time 2 Seconds 
  Maximum Engagement Range 160 Km 
  Minimum Engagement Range 4.5 Km 
Long-Range Surface-to-Air Weapon System 
  NSSM Velocity 0.44 Km/sec 
  NSSM Activation time 2 Seconds 
  Maximum Engagement Range 30 Km 
  Minimum Engagement Range 0.8 Km 
Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Weapon System 
  RAM Velocity 0.68 Km/sec 
  RAM System Activation time 2 Seconds 
  Maximum Engagement Range 8 Km 
  Minimum Engagement Range 0.8 Km 
Short-Range Weapon System 
  Burst Length 4 Seconds 
  Muzzle Velocity 1 Km/sec 
  CIWS Activation Time 1 Seconds 
  Maximum Engagement Range 1.5 Km 
  Minimum Engagement Range 0 Km 
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For the purposes of verification of the behavioral model, durations will be 
assigned to the function blocks based on the first launch opportunity for each weapon 
system.  Figure 12 shows how the range of the incoming missile changes with time, the 
first opportunity for launch given a maximum intercept range of 160 km, and the time of 
impact given the SM hits the ASM.  Figure 13 shows the same things, but illustrates how 
a SM slower velocity and reduced maximum engagement range changes the time of the 
first launch opportunity and the time of impact.  These estimated values were 
incorporated in the function durations, for the assumed single launch. 
 
 
Figure 12.   SM Range Target Graph 
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Figure 13.   NSSM Range Target Graph  
Table 6 shows the resulting time durations that were calculated for each function 
block included in the AAW EFFBD.  The time to launch missiles of the four SAM 
systems (SM, NSSM, RAM, and CIWS) includes the time that it takes the ASM to travel 
within engagement range and the time for the SAM to travel from the ship to the intercept 
point. 
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Table 6.   Function Block Durations 
Number Name Duration 
3.1.3 Detect airborne targets 1 
3.2.1 Classify surface and airborne targets electronically 1 
3.3.4.2 Activate launching system (SM) 2 
3.3.4.3 Launch missiles 180 
3.3.4.5 Guide missile to target 100 
3.5.4.4 Track missile's flight path 100 
4.1.1.2 Activate launching system (NSSM) 2 
4.1.1.3 Launch missiles 450 
4.1.1.4 Track missile's flight path 70 
4.1.1.5 Guide missile to target 70 
4.1.2.2 Activate launching system (RAM) 2 
4.1.2.3 Launch missiles 580 
4.1.2.4 Guide missile to target 12 
4.1.2.5 Track missile's flight path 12 
4.1.3.2 Activate firing system (CIWS) 1 
4.1.3.3 Track target and projectile's trajectory 6 
4.1.3.4 Guide projectiles to target 4 
4.1.3.5 Fire projectiles until target destroyed 605 
 
With all the time durations set, the EFFBD can be simulated.  The result of the 
simulation is a graphical display of how the allotted resource (e.g., time) was used up in 
reference to the maximum time of the scenario.  Clearly, in this simulation, as well as for 
a real world situation, the scenario has a variety of different outcomes Figure 14 and 













Figure 15.   AAW EFFBD Verification Simulation Result (2) 
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In Figure 14, an incoming ASM was detected; the system launched an NSSM 
missile, which failed to destroy the ASM.  Then the ASM was determined to be within 
medium range weapon distance so a RAM was launched, which also failed.  Upon 
sensing the RAM failure, in the final seconds of the scenario, once the incoming ASM 
was within CIWS firing range, it was engaged and destroyed by CIWS. 
The outcome in Figure 15 shows that the ASM was detected and determined to be 
within firing range for the NSSM.  One NSSM was fired and failed.  The system looped 
back to where the weapon system is determined based on the range of the ASM.  As it 
was within firing range for the short-range surface to air weapon system, it was engaged 
and destroyed by CIWS. 
In both simulations, the functions were completed within the allotted scenario 
time limit, meaning the missile was destroyed before it impacted the ship.  This verifies 
that the example systems (NSSM, CIWS, RAM) with their approximated characteristics 
can complete this scenario within a satisfactory amount of time. 
Although AAW is the only mission modeled for behavior in this thesis, this 
method of behavioral modeling and verification can be performed for each mission area 
of a ship.  Other resources can be assigned besides time such as power and ammunition to 
demonstrate functional and physical inconsistencies and limitations in this very early 
stage of the design process.   
Once it is determined how the system will perform in an AAW scenario against a 
single inbound enemy plane with one ASM, it can be modeled with more detail in a DES 
model.  That will help determine how individual system characteristics impact the overall 
ship performance.  In the next section, an AAW scenario will be simulated in a DES 
model, and the air search radar system characteristics will be varied to determine how 
radar detection range effects ship performance.   
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E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter demonstrated the architecture development step of the ship design 
method.  The requirements captured in the DRM were allocated to functions, which were 
decomposed by sub-functions and mapped to physical components.  A behavioral model 
was created to determine and illustrate how this architecture acts in a mission scenario.  
Then the logic of the behavioral model was verified by the use of a simulation that 
monitors resource use.  This architecture and behavioral model will be the basis for 
development of a mission effectiveness model in the next section. 
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IV. MISSION EFFECTIVENESS 
The purpose of the previous section was to demonstrate the development of a 
system description.  The system described in this thesis is a surface combatant with a list 
of functions and a list of general physical components that will enable it to operate 
independently in shallow water and defend itself from an ASM attack.  The description 
also includes a behavioral model, which shows how the system acts in a specific scenario, 
AAW in this case.  This section will take the description of what the system is and how it 
acts in a scenario and determine how the characteristics of the individual subsystems 
impact the overall performance.  For demonstration, the air search radar detection range 
will be varied to determine how it affects the scenario outcome. 
Effectiveness is measured in terms of achievement of mission objectives and 
desired results.  The sum of individual MOPs specific to the threat scenario quantifies the 
MOE.  For this thesis, the MOE used for demonstration of concept is the capability to 
perform AAW.  The probability of kill is recognized as the product of vulnerability and 
susceptibility, neither of which is being directly accounted for in this simple example 
effectiveness model.  The primary MOP is the inverse of the probability of taking a hit 
(1-PHit), which in, this study, will be referred to as the probability of survival, (Ps).  
Ps will be assessed in a DES Model. 
A. ANTI-AIR WARFARE MODEL 
This thesis continues previous work by Welch (2011) about investigating the link 
between combat system capability and ship design characteristics using MBSE.  The 
Extendsim model of that work matches the OPSIT of this thesis in that it generates a 
single threat and the system can react with multiple surface-to-air weapons.  Furthermore, 
this existing effectiveness model will be used because it has the capability to vary one 
input parameter, air search radar detection range. 
The following statements describe specific boundaries of the DES model:  
• The model is based on only one mission area (point defense in AAW). 
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• The model only evaluates Ps of the ship. 
• The model is focusing only on the aircraft’s standard ASM and the ship’s 
standard SAM for its defensive capabilities and does not consider the 
other weapon systems or countermeasures. 
 To make the model straightforward and simple for the purposes of demonstration, 
many assumptions have been incorporated into the development of the logic.  The 
following list makes up the major assumptions used to simplify the model:  
• The ship is stationary. 
• The ship is at its highest level of combat readiness; I&W that an air attack 
is imminent, all watch standers are alert, and approval for defensive 
actions has been issued. 
• The ship utilizes a shoot-look-shoot doctrine. 
• The enemy aircraft’s tactics consist of shooting exactly 1 ASM when it 
reaches its firing range, and immediately retreating from the area. 
• If the ship or aircraft is hit, PS = 0. 
• The PDetection of both the ship and aircraft’s radar is equal to 1. 
• All environmental and time factors (weather, sea state, visibility, 
temperature, etc.) are ideal for ship and aircraft combat system and 
weapon performance.   
1. Model Logic 
Each simulation begins with the generation of one enemy target, which will be 
identified as either an ASM or an aircraft.  In the case of an aircraft, the system will 
perform a series of queries and decisions before it engages the target.  Figure 16 shows 





Figure 16.   Logic Diagram for Warfare Effectiveness Model (From Welch, 2011) 
 44
2. Input Parameters 
The AAW model incorporates several inputs, most of which will remain constant 
to keep the model simple.  Table 7 includes all of the input parameters that will not 
change. 
Table 7.   Parameters Values Used in Effectiveness Model 
Constant Parameter Value 
Maximum Aircraft Firing Range 100 km 
Maximum Ship Firing Range 150 km 
Minimum Ship Firing Range 2 km 
Aircraft Velocity 0.3087 km/s 
SAM Velocity 0.8575 km/s 
ASM Velocity 0.686 km/s 
SAM Pk of Aircraft 0.65 
SAM Pk of ASM 0.6 
ASM Pk of Ship 0.85 
 
3. Variable Input Parameters 
One input parameter was chosen to be variable to demonstrate how the model, 
and therefore the system, might react with a different physical component.  For this 
thesis, the chosen variable is the radar detection range.  This input parameter is 
representative of the capability of the air search radar.  Each air search radar system has 
different corresponding characteristics including weight, power usage, volume, and 
height.  The primary capability that the air search radar contributes to the AAW scenario 
is the initial effective detection range, which is a function of each of these characteristics. 
Appendix E contains screen shots of the entire ExtendSim model. 
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B. EFFECTIVENESS MODEL RESULTS 
The MOP, Ps, was determined for each radar detection range from 20 km to 
300 km in 20 km increments.  Each range was simulated 1000 times to achieve a high 
confidence in the mean of the Ps.  Figure 17 shows the resulting means of the probability 
of survival versus the simulated detection range. 
 
 
Figure 17.   Probability of Survival vs. Detection Range Graph 
Approximately 180 km is the point at which any additional range of the radar’s 
detection adds little to no increase in the system’s probability of survival.  Therefore, if 
the stakeholders would like to have their system perform at a level of 40%, 90%, or 98%, 




C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The system architecture, functional and physical, was used to create a warfare 
effectiveness model.  The DES model determined how a characteristic of an individual 
system on the ship (air search radar detection range) impacts the MOP.  This 
determination will help decision makers and designers create a ship that meets the needs 
and requirements stated for this project in the DRM. 
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V. SHIP SYNTHESIS 
Now that a functional and physical architecture has been developed for a design 
solution and the effectiveness of that solution has been determined, alternative ship 
designs can be created.  This thesis intends to make a design space rather than a single 
design solution.  The design space reveals the tradeoffs that the solution experienced 
given a change in capability.  To achieve this end, an Excel-based ship synthesis model is  
used to create three alternative designs each with different corresponding capabilities.  
The capability of the ship is represented by the MOE in the effectiveness model. 
Three design alternatives are created to demonstrate a design space and the 
tradeoffs between cost and capabilities.  The three alternatives ship designs will 
incorporate radar systems that achieve the following probabilities of survival in the AAW 
scenario simulated in the previous section: 40%, 90% and 99%. 
A. EXCEL MODEL 
The ship synthesis model used to derive the design alternatives is a Microsoft 
Excel Spreadsheet created by Dr. Clifford Whitcomb based on an original ship synthesis 
model developed through the Naval Construction and Engineering Program at MIT.  It 
was created with the capability to receive inputs from the user based on a reference 
platform and be manipulated with manual iteration to output a stable and balanced ship 
design.  The design calculations within the model are based upon those used in the ship 
synthesis program used by the Navy.  Cost estimations, also included in the synthesis 
model, are very simple and based on the displacement of the ship. 
B. INPUT PARAMETERS 
As an iterative process, the synthesis model needs to have a starting place on 
which to base the initial calculations.  All inputs are selected to reflect the requirements 
stated in the DRM.  The combat system suite that will meet or exceed the capabilities 
requirements is chosen based on the options built into the spreadsheet model. 
 48
1. Reference Platform 
The synthesis model in the right general direction it needs to have an existing 
platform design on which to start iterations.  The NATO Specialist Team on Small Ship 
Design published a study, “Paper on Small Ship Design,” (2004), which analyzed two 
kinds of small ship, Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) and Small Littoral Combatant (SLC).  
Both platforms can be extremely useful in supporting or conducting Power Projection 
missions, especially with respect to littoral operations, which fits nicely into the mission 
profile of this thesis.  The missions and operations of the two platforms are similar in 
some areas but differentiated by their warfare capabilities, AAW in particular. 
The OPV is intended for this purpose of patrolling the waters of an exclusive 
economic zone and specializes in conducting law enforcement operations.  The SLC is 
better suited for Naval operations.  Naval operations, as described in the NATO 
publication, are Military Aid, Military Patrol, Military Control, and Military Power.  It is 
Military Power and Control that include the defensive AAW capability that is required 
for the mission profile of this thesis.  Since the DRM for this thesis requires that the ship 
have some AAW capability, the author selected the SLC as the most appropriate 
reference platform for design synthesis.  Some characteristics of the SLC from the NATO 
design paper are listed in Figure 18.  Many of these values were used as the starting point 
of iteration for the ship alternatives created for this thesis. 
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2000 LITTORAL COMBATANT                               
CHARACTERISTICS 
--------------- 
LENGTH (LOA)               328.00 FEET        99.97 METERS 
LENGTH (LBP)               308.00 FEET        93.88 METERS 
BEAM (B)                    43.42 FEET        13.23 METERS 
DRAFT, FULL LOAD (T)        12.39 FEET         3.78 METERS 
MEAN HULL DEPTH             29.76 FEET         9.07 METERS 
FREEBOARD AT FP             20.11 FEET         6.13 METERS 
FREEBOARD AT AP             17.11 FEET         5.22 METERS 
PRISMATIC COEFFICIENT         .6200     CWP     .7840 
MAXIMUM SECTION AREA COEF.    .7985     CIT     .0527400  
BLOCK COEFFICIENT             .4951     COMPLEMENT  110. 
DISPLACEMENT: MOLDED      2342.73 L.T.      2380.32 METRIC TONS 
              APPENDAGE     35.14 L.T.        35.70 METRIC TONS 
              DOME          48.50 L.T.        49.28 METRIC TONS 
              FULL LOAD   2426.37 L.T.      2465.31 METRIC TONS 
CUBIC NUMBER/100000          4.169              .1181  
TOTAL ENCLOSED VOLUME   408780.60 CU.FT.   11575.38 CUBIC METERS 
BODY PLAN:       30 KN CUTTER       
GERTLER WORM:        HIGH SPEED FRIGATE            
PCOEF (=EHP/SHP):    HIGH SPEED FRIGATE      
BOW DOME:  YES        
                    FULL LOAD   MEAN TRIAL     MIN. OP. 
DRAFT, FEET             12.39        11.96        11.82 
DISPL, LONG TONS      2426.37      2292.80      2250.39 
DISPL/(.01*LBP)**3      83.0434      78.4718      77.0202 
GM/BEAM                   .0871        .0819        .0850 
TRIAL SPEED, KNOTS      31.24        31.94 
SUSTAINED SPEED, KNOTS  29.16        29.73 
TRIPLE SCREW CODOG PROPULSION PLANT (OUTBOARD CPP PROPS, DIA=10.76 FT., RPM= 1600
CENTERLINE CPP PROP, DIA=14.2 FT.,RPM=210.00) 
     TWO HIGH SPEED DIESELS   8325.00 HP EACH OUTBOARD P/S 
     31000.00 HP GAS TURBINE CENTERLINE 
ENDURANCE (OPERATING PROFILE): 
  STORES & PROVISIONS = 20.00 DAYS 
  SPEED    FULL LOAD        MEAN TRIAL LOAD    FUEL OIL 
  KNOTS  DIST. NM    DAYS  DIST. NM    DAYS    LONG TONS 
  16.00   4367.42   11.37   4499.25   11.72      278.73 
ENCLOSED DECK AREA (SQFT.): 
     AVAILABLE =  30417.89     REQUIRED =  30111.44 
     AVAILABLE LESS REQUIRED =    306.46 
OPEN WEATHER DECK AREAS: 
     1668.78 SQFT. FWD OF STATION  3.247 
     3275.97 SQFT. AFT OF STATION 15.390  
Figure 18.   2000-Tonne SLC Synthesis Model Output (From NATO Naval Group 6 
Specialist Team on Small Ship Design, 2004) 
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There are some things to point out about this reference ship design that are not 
necessarily desirable in the ship alternatives to be created in this thesis.  For example, the 
number of propellers.  Three propellers leads to very complicated shafting arrangements 
and complicated the aft section design.   
2. Initialization 
Once the initial characteristics of the reference platform are considered, the Excel 
model can be populated and adjusted based on system requirements and design 
considerations.  Table 8 includes all of the input variables used for the three design 
alternatives.   
Table 8.   Input Values for Ship Synthesis Model 
Description Variable Value Units 
Gross Characteristics 
Initial Full Load Displacement WFL1 2426 lton 
Initial Payload Fraction FP 0.1  
Prismatic Coefficient CP 0.6  
Midship Section Coefficient CX 0.875  
Beam to Draft Ratio CBT 3.5  
Displacement Length Quotient CDisp-L 64 Lton/ft3 
Average Deck Height HDK 9 ft 
Depth at Station 10 DSTA10 31 feet 
Energy 
Payload Cruise Elect Power Req't kWPAY 623.49 kW 
Sustained Speed Requirement VS 30 knt 
Endurance Speed Requirement VE 16 knt 
Range Requirement E 8000 knt x hr 
Machinery 
Number of Propellers NP 2  
Number of APUs NAPU 0  
Number of Propulsion Engines NPENG 3  
Number of Ship Service Generators NG 5  
Fuel System FS NONCOMP  
Space 
Deckhouse Area, C&D ADPC 4116 ft2 
Deckhouse Area, Armament ADPA 5258 ft2 
Hull Area, C&D AHPC 5787 ft2 
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Description Variable Value Units 
Hull Area, Armament AHPA 3784 ft2 
Area, Sonar Dome ASD 215 ft2 
Weight 
Structure 
Armor Wt164 23 lton 
Sonar Dome Structure Wt165 0 lton 
Hull Material   HM HTS  
Deckhouse Material   DM Steel  
Hull Material Coefficient CHMAT 0.93  
Deckhouse Material Coefficient CDHMAT 2  
CPS Type CPS Full  
Payload 
Payload Weight WP 571.51 lton 
Payload VCG VCGP 24.24 ft 
Variable Payload Weight WVP 199.47 lton 
Variable Payload VCG VCGVP 25.44 ft 
Stores Period TS 30 days 
Command and Surveillance 
(W400 less 420 and 430) 
WP400 215.93 lton 
Mission Handling/Support (W500) WP500 39.46 lton 
Mission Outfit (W600) WP600 7.74 lton 
Armament (W700) WT7 93.65 lton 
Ordinance (WF20) WF20 135.67 lton 
Number Helicopters NHELO 0  
Helo Weight (WF23) WF23 0 lton 
Helo Fuel (WF42) WF42 63.8 lton 
Sonar Dome Water WT498 0 lton 
Sonar Dome Water VCG VCG498 0 ft 
Desired Radar Detection Range RD 100 km 
Manning 
Officers NO 15 people 
Enlisted (including CPO) NE 95 people 
Total NT 110 people 
 
SCN Cost Constraint SCN 700 M$ 
 
Some values have been adjusted from the reference model variables in order to 
meet the requirements of a balanced ship.  The power requirements of the ship with the 
selected combat system require more than four ship service diesel generators (SSDG) in 
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order to support the estimated electrical load for a cruising state.  This is because the 
Navy requires that all naval ships have one SSDG on standby in case one of the operating 
SSDGs fails. 
Stores requirements was increased from the reference SLC duration of 20 days to 
30 days in order to support the mission profile that involves the ship being positioned in 
the Yellow Sea off the coast of the adversary.  The area is remote, fog is an ever-present 
issue for vertical replenishment by helicopter, and very shallow for larger replenishment 
ships.  In order for commanding officers to have confidence in this ship being able to 
support this mission for a useful period of time, it should have the ability to carry enough 
stores and provisions for 30 days. 
Inputs that were not available in the reference platform design characteristics 
were selected to support standard naval practices.  The number of people on the ship was 
designated by the characteristics of the reference ship, however the spreadsheets accounts 
for officers and enlisted personnel differently with respects to space and weight.  The 110 
people were separated into 15 officers and 95 enlisted personnel to support the 
calculations in the spreadsheet. 
The electrical power generators used in this model are DDA149TI Diesel 
generators, which can operate at 1000kW vice the 880kW generators of the SLC 
reference ship. 
3. Combat Systems Configuration 
Requirements that impact the combat systems of the alternative ship designs are 
primarily those that are relevant to AAW and sustained independent operations.  Air and 
surface search radar systems, navigation, communications, surface to air weapon systems, 
and countermeasures are the primary systems that are necessary to support these 
operations.  The combat system suite of the reference ship is very similar to one of the 
suite options in the Excel model. 
Three combat system suites from the Excel model are available based on 
complexity.  The first option contains a very broad variety of systems that would support 
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independent operations in a large number of missions.  The second option is equipped to 
support a handful of primary warfare areas independently and others as a support 
platform in a battle group.  The third combat systems suite has the non-advanced version 
of weapon and sensor system.   
The combat systems suite selected for incorporation into the three design 
alternatives is the second option.  The DRM of this thesis requires that the ship have 
AAW capabilities.  This suite has an air search radar system, a vertical launch system, a 
combat information center (CIC) with a command and control computer system and two 
large screen displays, an advanced long range cruise missile weapon control system, and 
a Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) launcher system to support AAW. 
Table 9 provides a list of the major combat systems, based on the second option, 
and the corresponding weight, vertical center of gravity, area, and power usage in a 
normal “cruise” state as well as a fully ready “battle” configuration. 
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Table 9.   Combat Systems Payload Data 
PAYLOAD NAME WT KEY WT VCG VCG AREA HULL DKHS CRUISE BATTLE WT 
    DATUM FT AD KEY FT2 FT2 KW KW MOMENT 
STEEL LANDING PAD [ON HULL] -
HELICOPTER CAPABLE W111 10.7 30 0.20 NONE 0 0 0 0 323.14 
32 CELL VLS ARMOR  W164 14 38.31 -10 NONE 0 0 0 0 396.42 
GUN ARMOR  W164 9 37.8 -8.00 NONE 0 0 0 0 263.7 
5M BOW SONAR DOME W/MINE 
AVOIDANCE W165 85.7 0 -1.5  0 0 0 0 -128.55 
GROUP 100 WP100 119.4    0 0 0 0  
 
CIC W/ COMMAND AND 
CONTROL COMPUTER SYSTEM & 
2X LARGE SCREEN DISPLAYS W410 19.34 0 35.58 A1131 1953 448 45.03 45.03 688.11 
NAVIGATION SYSTEM W420 7.29 51 14.00 A1132 0 848.3 55.99 53.5 473.85 
ADV DIGITAL C4I (JTIDS, LINK 
16/LINK 22/TADIXS/TACINTEL) W440 37.91 51 -46.84 A1110 1230.6 1270.4 35.76 39.67 157.71 
MULITIFUNCTION SURFACE 
SEARCH RADAR W456 40 51 -10.00 A1121 0 70 8 0 1640 
AIR SEARCH RADAR  W452 2.89 51 -7.1 A1121 0 553 15.3 30.77 126.8 
IFF W455 2.32 51 -5.00 NONE 0 0 3.2 4 106.72 
X-BAND RADAR AND 
FOUNDATION, 110 FT ABOVE BL W456 4.11 0 113.00 NONE 0 0 220.16 220.16 464.43 
5M BOW SONAR DOME ELEX 
W/MINE AVOIDANCE W457 57.7 0 9.3 A1122 1942 0 0 0 536.61 
BATHYTHERMOGRAPH W458 0.31 30 -10.90 A1122 85.5 0 0 0 5.92 
SONOBUOY PROCESSING 
SYSTEM W459 5.26 51 -44.86 NONE 0 0 1.15 1.15 32.30 
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PAYLOAD NAME WT KEY WT VCG VCG AREA HULL DKHS CRUISE BATTLE WT 
    DATUM FT AD KEY FT2 FT2 KW KW MOMENT 
ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEM 
W/ ACTIVE ECM W460 4.4 33.4 20.60 NONE 0 0 6.4 6.4 237.6 
ELECTRO-ACOUSTIC DECOY 
(NIXIE) W461 0.24 30 -6.20 A1142 200 0 3 4.2 5.71 
DECOY LAUNCHING SYSTEM W/6 
LAUNCHERS W462 0.96 33.4 5.39 NONE 0 0 2.4 2.4 37.23 
5"/54 GUN FIRE CONTROL 
SYSTEM W463 7.50 51 -4.00 A1212 0 168 6 15.4 352.5 
MISSILE FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM 
- STIR/CORT/IADT/CEC W464 6.29 51 -1.40 NONE 0 0 50.3 85.8 311.98 
VLS WEAPON CONTROL SYSTEM W465 0.7 35.0585 2.54 A1220 56 310 13.62 19.69 26.318 
ADVANCED LONG RANGE 
CRUISE MISSILE WEAPON 
CONTROL SYSTEM W466 5.6 33.4 -7.80 NONE 0 0 13.27 13.27 143.36 
ASW CONTROL SYSTEM [ASWCS] 
W/SSTD W467 3.75 33.4 -12.60 A1240 320 0 8.61 8.61 78 
COMBAT DF W468 8.26 33.4 21.00 A1141 0 448 15.47 19.34 449.34 
ELECTRONIC TEST & CHECKOUT W469 1.1 38.315 10.80 NONE 0 0 0 0 54.02 
GROUP 400 WP400 215.92    5787.1 4115.7 503.66 569.39  
  
32-CELL VLS MAGAZINE 
DEWATERING SYSTEM W529 3.5 35.05 -0.46 NONE 0 0 0 0 121.09 
AVIATION FUEL SYS W542 4.86 35.05 -11.00 A1380 30 0 2 2.9 116.92 
RAST/RAST CONTROL/HELO 
CONTROL  W588 31.1 35.0585 -1.60 A1312 219 33 4.4 4.4 1040.55 
GROUP 500 WP500 39.46    249 33 6.4 7.3  
  
5M BOW SONAR DOME HULL W636 6.7 0 -2.5 NONE 0 0 0 0 -16.75 
 56
PAYLOAD NAME WT KEY WT VCG VCG AREA HULL DKHS CRUISE BATTLE WT 
    DATUM FT AD KEY FT2 FT2 KW KW MOMENT 
DAMPING 
AVIATION SHOP AND OFFICE W665 1.04 35.0585 -4.50 A1360 194 75 0 0 31.78 
GROUP 600 WP600 7.74    194 75 0 0  
            
1X GUN  W710 30 38.8 -6.20 A1210 270 0 36.18 37.88 933 
2X SSM QUAD CANNISTER 
LAUNCHERS  W721 4.1 33.4 1.17 A1220 0 0 0 1.6 141.73 
VLS 32-CELL W721 54 35.0585 1.14 A1220 128 0 69.65 69.65 1954.71 
2X SVTT ON DECK  W750 5.55 33.4 2.20 A1244 0 368 2 5 197.58 
GROUP 700 W7 93.65    398 368 107.83 114.13  
  
GUN AMMO - 600 RDS WF21 20 37.3 -28.40 A1210 798 68 0 0 178 
LAUNCHER MISSILE LOADOUT 
(ESSM, SM, VLA, TLAM, ATACMS) WF21 72 35.0585 0.34 A1220 1420 720 0 0 2548.69 
SSM (OVER THE HORIZON) 
MISSILES -- 8 RDS IN 
CANNISTERS  WF21 3.78 33.4 5.00 NONE 0 0 0 0 145.15 
ASW TORPEDOES -- 6 RDS IN 
SVTT TUBES  WF21 1.36 33.4 2.50 A1240 368 0 0 0 48.82 
DECOY LAUNCHING SYS SRBOC 
CANNISTERS - 100 RDS WF21 2.2 33.4 11.60 NONE 0 0 0 0 99 
SMALL ARMS AMMO - 7.62MM + 
50 CAL + PYRO WF21 4.1 33.4 -6 NONE 0 0 0 0 112.34 
HELO 18 X TORPEDOS & 
SONOBUOYS & PYRO WF22 9.87 35.05 4.80 A1374 0 588 0 0 393.40 
2X HELOS AND HANGAR (BASED) WF23 12.73 35.05 4.50 A1340 0 3406 5.6 5.6 503.57 
AVIATION SUPPORT AND SPARES WF26 9.42 35.05 5.00 A1390 357 0 0 0 377.35 
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PAYLOAD NAME WT KEY WT VCG VCG AREA HULL DKHS CRUISE BATTLE WT 
    DATUM FT AD KEY FT2 FT2 KW KW MOMENT 
BATHYTHERMOGRAPH PROBES WF29 0.21 30 -6.00 NONE 0 0 0 0 5.04 
GROUP WF20 WF20 135.67    2943 4782 5.6 5.6  
  
LAMPS MKIII: AVIATION FUEL 
[JP-5] WF42 63.8 0 10.4 A1380 0 0 0 0 663.52 
  
VARIABLE MILITARY 
PAYLOAD (WF20+WF42) WVP 199.47         
  
ARMAMENT (WP500, WP600, W7, 
WF20)      3784 5258    
         KWP   
TOTAL PAYLOAD WP 675.64    9571.1 9373.7 623.49 696.425 16378.82 
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C. BALANCING A SHIP 
The spreadsheet is set up with check and balance display to iterate through the 
model by changing certain values until a satisfactory balanced design is reached.  Table 
10 lists the areas of design and the criteria they must meet, all of which are unique to a 
single iteration.  These design areas are gross characteristics, energy, space (in terms of 
volume and area), weight, stability, and cost. 
For the iteration captured in Table 10, the depth at station 10 has a required 
minimum value of 27.69ft.  The table shows that the achieved value for the design 
alternative must be greater than this value in order to have stability given the other 
characteristics of the design such as length, beam, and weight.  Energy per online 
generator required by the estimated payload including the combat system suite is 
929.74kW for this iteration, which must be less than the available installed generator 
capacity of 1000kW, which is the rating of the DDA149TI Diesel generators used in the 
model. 
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Table 10.   Balanced Ship Evaluation 
Description AchievedVariable Value Units 
Required
Variable Value Units
Gross Characteristics       
Length on Waterline  415.3     
Beam  50.8     
Draft  14.5     
Depth at Station 10 DSTA10 31ft      > D10MIN 27.69 ft 
Energy       
Sustained Speed VS 30knt  30knt 
Endurance Speed VE 16knt  16knt 
Installed Shaft Horsepower DHP 49470hp    > PIREQ 40098.42hp 
Installed Generator Capacity kWG 1000kW   > kWGREQ 929.74kW 
Space       
Volume       
Deckhouse Volume VD 175000 ft3 VDR 127688 ft3 
Arrangeable Hull Volume VHA 272529 ft3 VHR 305081 ft3 
Total Arrangeable Volume VTA 447529 ft3     > VTR 432769.30 ft3 
Area     
Arrangeable Hull Area AHA 30281 ft2 AHR 33898 ft2 
Arrangeable Deckhouse Area ADA 19444 ft2 ADR 14188 ft2 
Total Arrangeable Area ATA 49725 ft2      > ATR 48085.47 ft2 
Weight       
Full Load Weight WFL 4585.0  WT 4584.7 lton 
Stability CGMB 0.11447 > CGMBR 0.1  
Cost SCN 700M$     > TLSAC 646.40M$ 
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D. COST ESTIMATION 
Various cost variables are calculated to demonstrate, in relative terms, the 
significance of the design considerations, including capabilities and ship characteristics.  
The synthesis model includes simplified cost models for the lead ship cost, follow ship 
cost, and life cycle cost.  The majority of the cost figures within each model are based on 
weight.  Scaling factors derived from historical data are applied to the calculated 
characteristics of the design alternatives to get an estimated cost value for each part of the 
ship or Ship Work Breakdown Structure (SWBS) group. 
Table 11 shows the lead ship cost calculations spreadsheet for the first alternative 
with scaling factors, shown in red text.   
Table 11.   Lead Ship Cost Data 
Description Variable Value Units 
Additional Characteristics    
Ship Service Life LS 30 years 
Initial Operational Capability YIOC 2010 year  
Total Ship Acquisition NS 20 ships 
Production Rate RP 3 ships/year
    
Inflation    
Base Year YB 1999  
Average Inflation Rate RI 3.73  
Inflation Factor FI 1.93  
    
Lead Ship Cost - Shipbuilder Portion    
SWBS Costs:    
Structure KN1 0.55  
 CL1D 9.84 M$ 
Propulsion KN2 1.20  
 CL2D 27.47 M$ 
Electric KN3 1.00  
 CL3D 18.90 M$ 
Command, Control, Surveillance 
(less payload GFM cost) KN4 2.00  
 CL4D 13.39 M$ 
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Description Variable Value Units 
Auxiliary KN5 1.50  
 CL5D 41.28 M$ 
Outfit KN6 1.00  
 CL6D 17.42 M$ 
Armament 
(less payload GFM cost) KN7 1.00  
 CL7D 1.43 M$ 
Margin Cost CLM 12.97 M$ 
Integration/Engineering 
(Lead ship includes detail design engineering 
costs for class) KN8 10.00  
 CL8D 79.29 M$ 
Ship Assembly and Support 
(Lead ship includes all tooling, jigs, special 
facilites for class) KN9 2.00  
 CL9D 17.34 M$ 
Total Lead Ship Construction Cost 
(BCC) CLCC 239.32 M$ 
Profit Factor FPROFIT 0.10  
Profit CLP 23.93 M$ 
Lead Ship Price PL 263.26 M$ 
Change Order Factor COF 0.12  
Change Orders CLCORD 31.59 M$ 
    
Total Shipbuilder Portion CSB 294.85 M$ 
    
Lead Ship Cost - Government Portion    
Other Support Factor OSF 0.03  
Other Support CLOTH 6.58 M$ 
Program Manager's Growth Factor PMGF 0.10  
Program Manager's Growth CLPMG 26.33 M$ 
Weight of Costed Military Payload WMP 471.03 lton 
Combat System GFE CER CSCER 0.32 M$/lton 
Helo cost HC 18.71 M$ 
Ordinance and Electrical GFE 
(Military Payload GFE) CLMPG 289.69 M$ 
HM&E GFE Factor HMEGFEF 0.02  
HM&E GFE 
(Boats, IC) CLHMEG 5.27 M$ 
Outfitting Cost Factor OCF 0.04  
Outfitting Cost CLOUT 10.53 M$ 
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Description Variable Value Units 
    
Total Government Cost CLGOV 338.40 M$ 
    
Total End Cost CLEND 633.24 M$ 
    
Total Lead Ship Acquisition Cost    
Post Delivery Cost (PSA) Factor PSACF 0.05  
PSA Cost PSAC 13.16 M$ 
Total Lead Ship Acquisition Cost TLSAC 646.41 M$ 
 
Data for estimated follow ship cost and life cycle cost are provided in Appendix 
E. 
E. SHIP ALTERNATIVES  
In order to demonstrate a design space that shows the effects and significance of 
the variable AAW capability, synthesis, and cost estimation were conducted for three 
ships each with a different level of AAW capability.  The first alternative performs rather 
poorly in the AAW scenario of the effectiveness model.  The second and third 
alternatives both perform well and the cost of a small increment of increased capability 
will be revealed. 
The capability being referred to in this section is the capability to perform AAW 
missions as determined in the effectiveness model.  The approximate MOEs and 
corresponding detection ranges for each of the design alternatives are as follows: 
• First alternative: 100km range for 40% Probability of survival 
• Second Alternative: 180km range for 90% Probability of Survival 
• Third Alternative: 240km range for 98% Probability of Survival 
Analysis conducted by Welch (2011) revealed the correlation between air search 
radar systems performance (i.e., radar detection range) and weight and power usage.  
This correlation has been reduced down to two equations, which have been incorporated 
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into the ship synthesis model such that a single input parameter, radar detection range, 
will influence the total ship weight and cost. 
1. First Alternative 
The first alternative can be thought of as the baseline case with only 100km of 
radar detection range, which corresponds to approximately 40% probability of survival 
against an ASM threat.  However, it comes out to have a total lead ship end cost of 
$633.24 million.  The first alternative ship design, or the baseline design, has a total full 
load weight of 4584.7 long tons with only 12% made up of combat systems. 
Table 12 provides a summary of the principal characteristics, weight, space, and 
manning for the first design alternative. 
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Table 12.   First Alternative Design Summary 
Principal Characteristics Weight Summary  
LWL 415.3 ft Description 
Weight
(lton)  
Beam 50.8 ft Group 1 1427.6  
Depth, Station 10 31.0 ft Group 2 380.0  
Draft 14.5 ft Group 3 210.7  
GMT 5.8 ft Group 4 273.4  
GM/B Ratio 0.114  Group 5 606.3  
CP 0.6  Group 6 317.0  
CX 0.875  Group 7 93.7  
        Sum 1 - 7 3270.9  
Sustained Speed 30.0knt Design Margin 330.9  
Endurance Speed 16.0knt Lightship Weight 3639.5  
Endurance 8000nm Loads 945.2  
   Full Load Weight 4584.7  
Number Main Engines 3  Full Load KG 18.77 ft 
Main Engine Rating 17000hp    
   Military Payload 571.5 lton 
SHP/Shaft 25500hp Payload Fraction 0.12  
Propeller Type CRP  Fuel Weight 692.7 lton 
Propeller Diameter 14.6 ft    
   Manning Summary  
Number SSGTG 5  Officers 15  
SSGTG Rating 1000kW Enlisted (Including NCO) 95  
Maximum Margined 
Electrical Load 3347kW Total 110  
      
Area Summary Volume Summary 
Hull Area 30281 ft2 Hull Volume 272529 ft3 
Superstructure Area 19444 ft2 Superstructure Volume 175000 ft3 
Total Area 49725 ft2 Total Volume 447529 ft3 
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The cost calculations for the first alternative are summarized in Table 13.  This 
ship design, with the expectation that it will be in service for 30 years and have 20 ships 
in its class is estimated to cost a total of $32,880.52 million over the life of the program.  
With a learning rate factor of 0.94, the first follow ship is estimated to cost $500.99 
million 
Table 13.   First Alternative Cost Information 
Total End Cost 633.24M$ 
Total Lead Ship Acquisition Cost 646.41 M$ 
Total Follow Ship Acquisition Cost 500.99M$ 
Total Life Cycle Cost (Undiscounted) 32,880.52M$ 
 
Tables 12 and 13 present the baseline values against which the second and third 
alternatives will be compared. 
2. Second Alternative 
This alternative has a much greater probability of survival against the ASM threat, 
however, that probability is not as good as the model will allow, which is 98%.  The only 
change in input parameters was the value for radar detection range.  With an increase of 
80% in AAW performance (measured only by probability of survival) the total cost 
becomes $634.80 million and the total full load weight is 4587.4 long tons.  This ship 
performs with a 90% probability of survival in the AAW scenario.  The design summary 
for the second alternative is in Table 14. 
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Table 14.   Second Alternative Design Summary 
Principal Characteristics Weight Summary  
LWL 415.3 ft Description 
Weight 
(lton)  
Beam 50.8 ft Group 1 1428.3  
Depth, Station 10 31.0 ft Group 2 380.1  
Draft 14.5 ft Group 3 210.7  
GMT 5.8 ft Group 4 275.7  
GM/B Ratio 0.114  Group 5 606.4  
CP 0.6  Group 6 317.0  
CX 0.875  Group 7 93.7  
   Sum 1 - 7 3274.1  
Sustained Speed 30.0knt Design Margin 331.2  
Endurance Speed 16.0knt Lightship Weight 3643.0  
Endurance 8000nm Loads 945.4  
   Full Load Weight 4588.4  
Number Main Engines 3  Full Load KG 18.78 ft 
Main Engine Rating 17000hp   
   Military Payload 573.7 lton 
SHP/Shaft 25500hp Payload Fraction 0.13  
Propeller Type CRP  Fuel Weight 692.9 lton 
Propeller Diameter 14.6 ft    
   Manning Summary 
Number SSGTG 5  Officers 15
SSGTG Rating 1000kW Enlisted (Including NCO) 95
Maximum Margined 
Electrical Load 3348kW Total 110
     
Area Summary Volume Summary 
Hull Area 30295 ft2Hull Volume 272655 ft3  
Superstructure Area 19444 ft2Superstructure Volume 175000 ft3  
Total Area 49739 ft2Total Volume 447655 ft3  
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The estimated values for the second alternative are listed in Table 15.  This shows 
that a ship that has a 90% probability of survival will have an estimated end cost of 
$634.84 million. 
Table 15.   Second Alternative Cost Information 
Total End Cost 634.84M$ 
Total Lead Ship Acquisition Cost 648.01M$ 
Total Follow Ship Acquisition Cost 502.43M$ 
Total Life Cycle Cost (Undiscounted) 32,928.33M$ 
 
3. Third Alternative 
The third ship is designed with a combat system that can perform at 98% 
probability of survival in the AAW effectiveness model.  To create this alternative, the 
baseline design was modified for 240km detection range.  Then the ship was evaluated 
and adjusted for balance and stability.  Characteristics of the third alternative ship design 
are listed in Table 16.   
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Table 16.   Third Alternative Design Summary 
Principal Characteristics Weight Summary  
LWL 415.5 ft Description 
Weight
(lton)  
Beam 50.8 ft Group 1 1428.9  
Depth, Station 10 31.0 ft Group 2 380.1  
Draft 14.5 ft Group 3 210.7  
GMT 5.8 ft Group 4 277.4  
GM/B Ratio 0.114  Group 5 606.5  
CP 0.6  Group 6 317.1  
CX 0.875  Group 7 93.7  
        Sum 1 - 7 3276.6  
Sustained Speed 30.0knt Design Margin 331.4  
Endurance Speed 16.0knt Lightship Weight 3645.8  
Endurance 8000nm Loads 945.6  
   Full Load Weight 4591.4  
Number Main Engines 3  Full Load KG 18.79 ft 
Main Engine Rating 17000hp   
   Military Payload 575.3 lton 
SHP/Shaft 25500hp Payload Fraction 0.13  
Propeller Type CRP  Fuel Weight 693.1 lton 
Propeller Diameter 14.6 ft    
   Manning Summary  
Number SSGTG 5  Officers 15  
SSGTG Rating 1000kW Enlisted (Including NCO) 95  
Maximum Margined 
Electrical Load 3349kW Total 110  
      
Area Summary Volume Summary 
Hull Area 30309 ft2 Hull Volume 272780 ft3 
Superstructure Area 19444 ft2 Superstructure Volume 175000 ft3 
Total Area 49753 ft2 Total Volume 447780 ft3 






Cost data for the third alternative is included in Table 17. 
Table 17.   Third Alternative Cost Information 
Total End Cost 636.04M$ 
Total Lead Ship Acquisition Cost 649.22 M$ 
Total Follow Ship Acquisition Cost 503.51M$ 
Total Life Cycle Cost (Undiscounted) 32,964.38M$ 
 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter demonstrates how the architecture of the ship is translated into a ship 
design.  It discusses how an Excel ship synthesis model is used to calculate all the ship 
characteristics and costs associated with three alternatives.  The model uses inputs from a 
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VI. DESIGN SPACE ANALYSIS 
The data collected from each alternative (including the baseline alternative) has 
been plotted to illustrate the tradeoffs in terms of cost, weight, radar detection range, and 
probability of survival. 
A. SHIP DESIGN VERSUS CAPABILITY 
Weight as an element of ship design is influenced in a linear fashion by the radar 
system selection, which represents the mission capability.  Figure 19 shows three data 
points that represent the three alternative ship designs. The relationship between the 
variables weight and radar detection range is linear. Therefore, the slope of the trendline 
represents the cost of every additional kilometer of detection range.  A kilometer of 
additional radar detection range impacts the weight with 0.0478 ltons. 
 
 
Figure 19.   Weight vs. Detection Range Graph 
Figure 20 shows the tradeoff that you have in terms of weight for the increased 
capability in the AAW scenario.  A ship to be designed with a probability of survival that  
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is approximately 0.5 greater than the baseline will weigh an estimated 3.7 ltons more.  
Yet, to add on the last 0.08 to the probability of survival adds an additional 3 ltons to the 
total weight.   
Decision makers should consider whether or not they want to add 3.7 ltons to the 
baseline design for 0.5 increase in probability of survival or add nearly twice that much 
weight and get 0.58 increase.   
 
 
Figure 20.   Weight vs. Probability of Survival Graph 
B. COST VERSUS CAPABILITY 
Figure 21 shows that a linear relationship exists between the total end cost of a 
ship and the radar detection range.  The slope of the trendline indicates that the cost of 
every additional kilometer in range costs $20,000.  The purchase price of every kilometer 






Figure 21.   Cost vs. Detection Range Graph 
Figure 22 shows that relationship between capability and cost is not linear.  
Essentially, it costs $1.6 million for an increase in capability of 0.5 but it costs 
$1.2 million for the additional 0.08 capability of alternative 3.   
 
 
Figure 22.   Cost vs. Probability of Survival Graph 
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The slope between the first two data points (alternative one and alternative two), 
is 3.08 which (when multiplied by 0.01) indicates that the cost of adding 0.1 to the 
probability of survival is $30,800.  Whereas, an increase in probability of survival by 0.1 
from the second alternative to the third is approximatly $171,400, which is approximately 
a 460% increase in the price of 0.1 probability of survival. 
The decision to be made is how important is it to have a probability of survival at 
98%.  Is it worth the tradeoff in cost and in weight? 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter demonstrated how the proposed ship design method incorporates a 
synthesis model to reveal the tradeoffs of cost vs. capability and ship design vs. 
capability.  The results of the effectiveness model showed the impact that an individual 
system characteristic (air search radar detection range) had on the MOE.  This section 
also shows how that characteristic translates to cost and overall ship design.   
 75
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis proposed a method for combatant ship design using MBSE.  That is, 
simulation models were elevated to a central and governing role in the specification and 
design of a naval surface combatant.   
A. SUMMARY 
Notionally, the U.S. Navy has a need for a surface combatant that could perform a 
particular mission, independent power projection in the Yellow Sea.  This need was 
interpreted and a DRM was developed outlining the mission profile, operational 
environment, threats, measures of performance, and system requirements.  It was 
determined that there was a threat of attack by ASM with characteristics similar to that of 
a French Exocet missile.  The ship needs to be able to complete this mission without 
being resupplied for up to a month and defend itself against the airborne attack. 
From that DRM, the architecture was developed for a ship in terms of functions 
and physical components.  The architecture was then modeled to show how the ship 
would behave in a particular situation, AAW mission scenario.  A mission effectiveness 
model was created using the architecture and behavior model as a reference.  This model 
showed how individual system specifications (air search radar detection range) impact 
the effectiveness of the ship in the AAW mission. 
Then the ship was synthesized using a reference ship as a starting point and 
incorporating a variety of radar detection ranges to reveal the relationships between cost, 
ship design, and capability.  A trade space using actual feasible ship designs and 
estimated costs was created to reveal the tradeoffs of improving capability. 
B.  CONCLUSIONS 
This work addressed several questions regarding MBSE and system architecture 
development and how they contribute to improving the outcome of the combatant ship 
design process.  These questions and their answers are discussed: 
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Can a structured model-based approach to ship design provide a consistent basis 
for connecting capability need to the end solution?  MBSE tools such as CORE provide 
for identification and mapping of interfaces, mapping of needs to requirements to 
solutions, and provide a cohesive and consistent system model upon which to base the 
design process.  A solution neutral functional architecture was developed through to 
reveal the functions necessary to satisfy the stakeholder’s needs.  As assumed for the 
purposes of demonstration, the physical architecture alternative for a ship was selected 
for exploration of behavior and mission effectiveness.  With physical components 
mapped to the functional architecture linking the physical architecture to the capability 
need, an EFFBD was created to model the logical behavior of these functions as 
performed by the physical components.  The EFFBD, in part, helps to determine design 
specifications necessary to satisfactorily meet the capability need as well as identify 
limitations and/or constraints existing in the physical architecture (demonstrated by a 
resource-monitoring simulation of the EFFBD within COREsim).  Also aiding in the 
identification of design specifications is DES modeling of the mission scenario in 
ExtendSim to capture mission effectiveness across varying input parameters.  The 
ExtendSim model reflects the behavior logic described in the EFFBD, therefore simulates 
the performance of the system described by the functional and physical architectures.  
The ExtendSim model links to the capability need through the physical architecture and 
the EFFBD.  The design alternatives created reflect the identified design specifications 
from the EFFBD, ExtendSim model, and physical architecture.  Thus, the link between 
capability need and end solution (ship synthesis) is made through a functional 
architecture description, the physical architecture of a ship, behavioral modeling, and 
mission effectiveness modeling.   
How can a ship be designed effectively in terms of performance and effectiveness 
related to mission capabilities?  Effectiveness in the design process can be enhanced 
through the use of MBSE tools.  By elevating models to a central and governing role in 
the specification, design, integration, and validation, the system performance can be 
simulated for future threat environments.  MBSE was used to demonstrate how the  
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quantitative results of a tradeoff between ship characteristics, such as displacement and 
cost, and mission effectiveness can be used to reason about the engineering possibilities 
involved. 
In what ways can modeling tools promote the creation of the right design solution 
in terms of performance and effectiveness related to mission capabilities?  Enhancing the 
traceability between steps of the design process will help to ensure the validity of the 
design solution.  The right design solution is ensured by linking it to the mission 
effectiveness model, behavioral model, physical architecture, functional architecture, and 
finally to the capability needs. 
How can MBSE be used to enhance traceability throughout a combatant ship 
design process to produce a valid trade-space for decision-makers?  This thesis shows 
that MBSE can be used to aide designers and decision-makers in developing a solution 
that meets their needs while being aware of the tradeoffs early in the conceptual design 
phase.  The analysis performed through ExtendSim, CORE, and ship synthesis reveals 
significant considerations between cost, capability, and design. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further research in this area includes development of a more complex DRM that 
would demonstrate how a multi-mission ship would go through these design steps.  That 
would require that multiple behavioral models and mission effectiveness models be 
created.  Also, more research could be done in the area of individual system 
characteristics that might impact the MOE.  For instance, in this thesis as well as in that 
of Welch (2011), the characteristic evaluated was air search radar detection range.  
Further research could evaluate the impact of weapon load out in a more complex AAW 
scenario.   
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APPENDIX A. COMPLETE FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY 
 
Figure 23.   Second-level Functional Decomposition of Function 1 
 
Figure 24.   Second-level Functional Decomposition of Function 2 
 










Figure 26.   Second-level Functional Decomposition of Function 5 
 
Figure 27.   Second-level Functional Decomposition of Function 6 
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APPENDIX B. COMPLETE TABLE OF FUNCTIONS MAPPED 
TO PHYSICAL COMPONENTS  
Table 18.   Complete List of Functions Mapped to Physical Components 
Number Function Component 
0 Perform Surface Combatant Missions  0 Ship 
1 Move through water  1 Propulsion system 
1.1 Produce propulsive power to achieve sustained speed  1.1 Main propulsion engines (MPE) 
1.2 Provide propulsive power at usable speed (rpm)  1.2 Reduction gear 
1.3 Transfer power to water  1.3 CRP propeller 
1.4 Control speed and direction of movement locally 
 1.4 Engineering operations station 
(EOS) 
1.5 Control speed and direction of movement remotely  1.5 Lee helm 
2 Maintain desired course  2 Maneuvering and control system 
2.1 Determine if course is "safe"  2.1 Navigation equipment 
2.2 Alter existing course  2.2 Rudder 
2.3 Maneuver alongside pier  2.3 Bow thrusters/APU's 
3 Neutralize enemy targets  3 Combat systems configuration 
3.1 Detect targets  3.1 Ship's sensors 
3.1.1 Detect surface and shore based targets  3.1.1 Surface search radar (2D) 
3.1.1.1 Switch between transmit/ receive modes  3.1.1.1 Duplexer 
3.1.1.2 Transmit/ receive EM pulses  3.1.1.2 Antenna 
3.1.1.3 Process EM data  3.1.1.3 Computer 
3.1.1.4 Display contacts  3.1.1.4 Radar repeater screen 
3.1.1.5 Receive electrical power  3.1.1.5 Electrical hardwire connection point 
3.1.1.6 Energize/ de-energize  3.1.1.6 Control panel 
3.1.2 Detect subsurface targets  3.1.2 Sonar 
3.1.2.1 Detect subsurface contacts without additionally compromising position 
 3.1.2.1 Passive sonar (towed array 
"tail") 
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Number Function Component 
3.1.2.2 Detect subsurface contacts with compromising position  3.1.2.2 Active sonar (sonar dome) 
3.1.3 Detect airborne targets  3.1.3 Air search radar (3D) 
3.1.3.1 Switch between transmit/ receive  3.1.3.1 Duplexer  
3.1.3.2 Transmit/ receive EM pulse  3.1.3.2 Antenna  
3.1.3.3 Process EM data   3.1.3.3 Computer  
3.1.3.4 Display contacts  3.1.3.4 Radar repeater screen  
3.1.3.5 Receive electrical power   3.1.3.5 Electrical hardwire connection point 
3.1.3.6 Energize/ de-energize   3.1.3.6 Control point  
3.1.4 Detect electromagnetic (EM) emissions 
 3.1.4 Electronic countermeasures 
(ECM) surveillance antennas 
3.1.4.1 Filter/ process (amplify) EM data received  3.1.4.1 Computer  
3.1.4.2 Display EM data  3.1.4.2 ECM display screen 
3.1.4.3 Receive electrical power   3.1.4.3 Electrical hardwire connection point  
3.1.4.4 Energize/de-energize   3.1.4.4 Control panel  
3.2 Classify targets  3.2 Surveillance systems with identification protocols 
3.2.1 Classify surface and airborne targets electronically 
 3.2.1 Identification friend/ foe (IFF) 
system 
3.2.1.1 Receive IFF signal  3.2.1.1 IFF antenna 
3.2.1.2 Interpret IFF signal  3.2.1.2 Computer with database 
3.2.1.3 Display IFF signal data  3.2.1.3 IFF display screen 
3.2.1.4 Receive electrical power   3.2.1.4 Electrical hardwire connection point 
3.2.1.5 Energize/de-energize   3.2.1.5 Control panel  
3.2.2 Classify subsurface targets  3.2.2 Passive sonar signature identification protocol 
3.2.3 Classify EM emissions  3.2.3 EM signature identification library 
3.2.3.1 Receive EM emissions data  3.2.3.1 Transfer protocol 
3.2.3.2 Interpret EM emissions comparing to stored library  3.2.3.2 Computer  
3.2.3.3 Display classification data  3.2.3.3 ECM display screen  
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Number Function Component 
3.2.3.4 Receive electrical power   3.2.3.4 Electrical hardwire connection point  
3.2.3.5 Energize/ de-energize   3.2.3.5 Control panel  
3.3 Engage targets  3.3 Weapon systems 
3.3.1 Engage long range surface/ shore based targets 
 3.3.1 Surface to surface/ land attack 
missile system (Tomahawk) 
3.3.1.1 Store missiles  3.3.1.1 Canisters (VLS cells) 
3.3.1.2 Activate launching system  3.3.1.2 Targeting transfer protocol 
3.3.1.3 Launch missiles  3.3.1.3 Missile launch switch 
3.3.1.4 Guide missiles to target  3.3.1.4 Guidance system (integral to missile) 
3.3.1.5 Track missile's trajectory  3.3.1.5 Missile system fire control radar 
3.3.1.6 Allow simultaneous launches  3.3.1.6 Computer  
3.3.1.7 Receive electrical power   3.3.1.7 Electrical hardwire connection point  
3.3.1.8 Energize/ de-energize   3.3.1.8 Control panel  
3.3.2 Engage short range surface/ shore based targets  3.3.2 Naval gun 
3.3.2.1 Support gun operations  3.3.2.1 Gun support features 
3.3.2.2 Activate firing system  3.3.2.2 Targeting transfer protocol  
3.3.2.3 Maneuver gun in to firing position  3.3.2.3 Gun hydraulic system 
3.3.2.4 Fire gun  3.3.2.4 Gun firing switch 
3.3.2.5 Track projectile's trajectory  3.3.2.5 Gun fire control radar 
3.3.2.6 Receive electrical power  3.3.2.6 Electrical hardwire connection 
3.3.2.7 Energize/ de-energize   3.3.2.7 Control power  
3.3.3 Engage subsurface targets  3.3.3 Torpedo and depth charge delivery system 
3.3.3.1 Support torpedo operations  3.3.3.1 Torpedo support features 
3.3.3.2 Charge torpedo for launch  3.3.3.2 Breach 
3.3.3.3 Launch torpedoes  3.3.3.3 Torpedo launch switch 
3.3.3.4 Guide torpedo to target  3.3.3.4 Guidance system integral to torpedo 
3.3.3.5 Track torpedo's trajectory  3.3.3.5 Passive sonar 
3.3.3.6 Receive electrical power   3.3.3.6 Electrical hardwire connection point  
3.3.3.7 Energize/ de-energize   3.3.3.7 Control panel  
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Number Function Component 
3.3.4 Engage airborne targets  3.3.4 Surface to air missile system 
3.3.4.1 Store missiles   3.3.4.1 Canister (VLS cells)  
3.3.4.2 Activate launching system   3.3.4.2 Targeting transfer protocol  
3.3.4.3 Launch missiles  3.3.4.3 Missile launch switch 
3.3.4.4 Track missile's flight path   3.3.4.4 Missile fire control radar  
3.3.4.5 Guide missile to target  3.3.4.5 Illuminators 
3.3.4.6 Allow simultaneous launches  3.3.4.6 Computer  
3.3.4.7 Receive electrical power  3.3.4.7 Electrical hardwire connection point 
3.3.4.8 Energize/ de-energize   3.3.4.8 Energize/ de-energize 
3.4 Operate as "node" sharing information within super system 
 3.4 Combat systems networking 
protocol (NTDS, JMCIS, etc.) 
3.4.1 Transmit target information  3.4.1 Transmit protocol 
3.4.2 Receive target information  3.4.2 Receive protocol 
3.5 Provide target prosecution flexibility  3.5 Embarked helicopter 
4 Protect from enemy attack  4 Countermeasures methods 
4.1 Neutralize enemy weapon's effect by "hard kill"  4.1 Self defense weapons 
4.1.1 Neutralize long range airborne weapon (missile) 
 4.1.1 Long range surface to air missile 
system (NATO Sea Sparrow) 
4.1.1.1 Store missiles  4.1.1.1 Canisters (VLS cells) 
4.1.1.2 Activate launching system   4.1.1.2 Targeting transfer protocol (4.1.1.2) 
4.1.1.3 Launch missiles  4.1.1.3 Missile launch switch 
4.1.1.4 Track missile's flight path  4.1.1.4 Missile fire control radar  
4.1.1.5 Guide missile to target  4.1.1.5 Illuminators 
4.1.1.6 Allow simultaneous launches  4.1.1.6 Computer 
4.1.1.7 Receive electrical power  4.1.1.7 Electrical hardwire connection point 
4.1.1.8 Energize/ de-energize  4.1.1.8 Control panel  
4.1.2 Neutralize medium range airborne weapon (missile) 
 4.1.2 Medium range surface to air 
missile system (RAM) 
4.1.2.1 Store missiles  4.1.2.1 Canisters (RAM cells) 
4.1.2.2 Activate launching system   4.1.2.2 Targeting transfer protocol 
4.1.2.3 Launch missiles  4.1.2.3 Missile launch switch 
4.1.2.4 Guide missiles to target   4.1.2.4 Infrared guidance system integral to missile  
4.1.2.5 Track missile's flight trajectory   4.1.2.5 Missile fire control radar 
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4.1.2.6 Allow simultaneous launches  4.1.2.6 Computer  
4.1.2.7 Receive electrical power   4.1.2.7 Electrical hardwire connection point  
4.1.2.8 Energize/de-energize   4.1.2.8 Control panel 
4.1.3 Neutralize short range airborne weapon (missile) 
 4.1.3 Close in weapons system 
(CIWS) 
4.1.3.1 Store projectiles  4.1.3.1 Integral storage bin 
4.1.3.2 Activate firing system  4.1.3.2 Automatic arming switch 
4.1.3.3 Track target and projectile's trajectory  4.1.3.3 integral fire control radar  
4.1.3.4 Guide projectiles to target  4.1.3.4 Projectile-target position matching protocol 
4.1.3.5 Fire projectiles until target destroyed  4.1.3.5 Computer 
4.1.3.6 Receive electrical power  4.1.3.6 Electrical hardwire connection point 
4.1.3.7 Energize/ de-energize  4.1.3.7 Control panel 
4.2 Neutralize enemy weapon's effect by "soft kill"  4.2 self defense decoys 
4.2.1 Neutralize acoustic targeted weapons  4.2.1 Deployable noisemakers (Nixie)
4.2.1.1 Hold noisemaker  4.2.1.1 Canister 
4.2.1.2 Charge noisemaker for launch  4.2.1.2 Breach  
4.2.1.3 Launch noisemaker  4.2.1.3 Noisemaker launch switch 
4.2.1.4 Track noisemaker's trajectory  4.2.1.4 Passive sonar  
4.2.1.5 Receive electrical power   4.2.1.5 Electrical hardwire connection point 
4.2.1.6 Energize/ de-energize   4.2.1.6 Control panel  
4.2.2 Neutralize home on EM weapons  4.2.2 Electronic countermeasures (ECCM) 
4.2.2.1 Determine EM frequency being targeted  4.2.2.1 Computer 
4.2.2.2 Select respective EM frequency to be jammed  4.2.2.2 Frequency selection protocol 
4.2.2.3 Jam respective EM spectrum range  4.2.2.3 Antenna emitting high intensity EM pulse 
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4.2.2.4 Receive electrical power  4.2.2.4 Electrical hardwire connection point  
4.2.2.5 Energize/ de-energize   4.2.2.5 Control panel  
4.2.3 Neutralize home on IR weapons  4.2.3 Deployable IR decoys (Torch) 
4.2.3.1 Hold decoy  4.2.3.1 Canister  
4.2.3.2 Launch decoy  4.2.3.2 IR decoy launch switch 
4.2.3.3 Receive electrical power   4.2.3.3 Electrical hardwire connection point  
4.2.3.4 Energize/ de-energize   4.2.3.4 Control panel 
4.2.4 Neutralize home on object weapons  4.2.4 Deployable false targets (Chaff) 
4.2.4.1 Hold false target  4.2.4.1 Canister  
4.2.4.2 Launch false target  4.2.4.2 Chaff launch switch 
4.2.4.3 Receive electrical power   4.2.4.3 Electrical hardwire connection point 
4.2.4.4 Energize/ de-energize   4.2.4.4 Control panel  
4.3 Reduce likelihood of enemy detection  4.3 Signatures reduction 
4.3.1 Reduce detection by acoustic sensing means 
 4.3.1 Acoustic masking and vibration 
damping 
4.3.1.1 Mask propeller noise  4.3.1.1 Prairie system 
4.3.1.2 Mask hull noise  4.3.1.2 Masker system 
4.3.1.3 Absorb vibrations  4.3.1.3 Vibration absorbent decks (rubber matting) 
4.3.1.4 Absorb engine vibrations (specifically)  4.3.1.4 Vibration absorbent mounts 
4.3.2 
Reduce detection by 
electromagnetic (EM) sensing 
means 
 4.3.2 Exploitation of radar EM pulse 
characteristics 
4.3.2.1 Minimize radar cross section (RCS)  4.3.2.1 Superstructure construction 
4.3.2.2 Cause radar EM pulse to not return to source 
 4.3.2.2 Radar absorbent material 
(RAM) applied to superstructure 
4.3.3 Reduce detection by infrared (IR) sensing means  4.3.3 Dissipation of heat source 
4.3.3.1 Dissipate engine exhaust heat  4.3.3.1 Stack boundary layer infrared suppression system (BLISS) 
4.3.3.2 Dissipate general space heat  4.3.3.2 Ventilation insulation 
4.3.4 Reduce detection by EM surveillance means 
 4.3.4 EM radiation control (EMCON 
conditions) 
 87
Number Function Component 
4.3.5 Reduce detection by magnetic field actuated ordnance  4.3.5 Degaussing system 
4.3.5.1 Input magnetic signature adjustments  4.3.5.1 Degaussing control station 
4.3.5.2 Adjust transverse magnetic signature  4.3.5.2 M-Coil 
4.3.5.3 Adjust longitudinal magnetic signature  4.3.5.3 L-Coil 
4.3.5.4 Adjust vertical magnetic signature  4.3.5.4 P-Coil 
5 Conduct sustained underway operations  5 Support/Auxiliary systems 
5.1 Ensure habitable conditions  5.1 Crew support/ habitability features
5.2 Maintain equipment in operating condition  5.2 Maintenance philosophy 
5.3 Communicate information  5.3 Communications equipment 
5.4 Combat damage  5.4 Damage control (DC) systems and equipment 
5.5 Secure position while underway  5.5 Anchoring system 
5.6 Secure position while in port  5.6 Mooring system 
5.7 Provide electrical power  5.7 Electrical system 
5.8 Provide fuel source  5.8 Fuel system 
6 Operate on surface of water  6 Hull form 
6.1 Enclose personnel and equipment  6.1 Hull 
6.2 Support total ship weight  6.2 Displaced hull form volume 
6.3 Minimize total resistance  6.3 Hull form characteristics (coefficients of form) 
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Figure 29.   AAW EFFBD (ASM detected branch) 
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APPENDIX E. COST ESTIMATION DATA SHEETS 
Table 19.   Follow Ship Cost Calculation Sheet 
Description Variable Value Units 
Follow Ship Cost    
Learning Rate Factor LRF 0.94  
Learning Rate LR 0.89  
    
Follow Ship Cost - Shipbuilder Portion    
Follow Ship Basic Construction Cost CFBCC 115.29 M$ 
Follow Ship Margin Cost CFM 11.53 M$ 
Integration/Engineering Follow Ship Factor CF800F 0.10  
Integration/Engineering Follow Ship Exponent CF800E 1.10  
Integration/Engineering CF800C 21.30 M$ 
Ship Assembly and Support CF900C 15.41 M$ 
Total Follow Ship Construction Cost CFCC 163.52 M$ 
Profit FPROFIT 0.10  
Total Follow Ship Price PF 179.87 M$ 
Follow Ship Change Order Factor FSCOF 0.08  
Change Order Cost COC 14.39 M$ 
Total Follow Ship Cost Shipbuilder Portion CFSB 194.26 M$ 
    
Follow Ship Cost - Government Portion    
Follow Ship Other Cost Factor FSOCF 0.03  
Follow Ship Other Cost FSOC 4.65 M$ 
Follow Ship Program Manager's Growth 
Factor FPMGF 0.05  
Follow Ship Program Manager's Growth FPMG 8.99 M$ 
Follow Ship Combat System GFE CER FSCSCER 0.30 M$/lton
Follow Ship Ordinance and Electrical GFE 
(Military Payload GFE) FCMPG 273.30 M$ 
Follow Ship HM&E GFE Factor FHMEGFEF 0.02  
HM&E GFE 
(Boats, IC) FCHMEG 3.60 M$ 
Outfitting Cost Factor FOCF 0.04  
Outfitting Cost FCOUT 7.19 M$ 
    




Description Variable Value Units 
    
Total Follow Ship End Cost CFEND 491.99 M$ 
    
Follow Ship PSA Cost Factor CFPSAF 0.05  
Follow Ship PSA Cost CFPSA 8.99 M$ 




Table 20.   Life Cycle Cost Calculation Sheet 
Description Variable Value Units 
Research and Development    
Ship Design and Development    
Ship Design and Development Factor SDDF 0.10  
Basic Ship Construction Design and Development 
Factor BSDDF 0.57  
Government Military Payload Design and 
Development Factor MPSDDF 0.07  
Ship Design and Development Cost CSDD 159.82 M$ 
    
Ship Test and Evaluation    
Ship Test and Evaluation Factor STEF 0.20  
Basic Ship Construction Test and Evaluation Factor BSTEF 0.50  
Government Military Payload Test and Evaluation 
Factor MPSTEF 0.65  
Ship Test and Evaluation Cost CSTE 355.82 M$ 
    
Total Ship Research and Development Cost CRD 515.64 M$ 
    
Investment (less base facilities, unrep, etc.)    
Cost of ships CSPE 8802.61 M$ 
Average Ship Cost CAVG 440.13 M$ 
Cost of Support Equipment (Shore Based)    
Support Equipment Factor SEF 0.15  
Cost of Ship Support Equipment CSSE 1320.39 M$ 
Cost of Spares and Repair Parts (Shore Supply)    
Spares and Repair Parts Factor SRPF 0.10  
Cost of Spares and Repair Parts CISS 880.26 M$ 
    
Total Investment Cost CINV 11003.26 M$ 
    
Operations and Support    
Personnel (Pay and Allowances)    
Officer Cost Factor CFO 0.03  
CPO and Enlisted Cost Factor CFE 0.02  
Cost of Pay and Allowances CPAY 4998.36 M$ 
TAD Factor TADF 0.00  




Description Variable Value Units 
Total Cost of Personnel CPERS 4999.03 M$ 
    
Operations    
Number of Operating Hours per Year H 3018.06 hours 
Operations Cost Factor 1 OCF1 188.00  
Operations Cost Factor 2 OCF2 2.23  
Operating Hours Factor  26.90 hours 
Operating Hours Cost Factor OHCF 0.04 1/hours 
Average Ship Cost Factor for Operations ASFCO 0.00 1/$ 
Government Follow Ship Military Payload Cost 
Factor MPGCF 0.01 1/$ 
Cost of Operations COPS 1913.42 M$ 
    
Maintenance    
Maintenance Cost Factor 1 MCF1 2967.00  
Maintenance Cost Factor 2 MCF2 4.81  
Maintenance Hours Factor  3.05 hours 
Maintenance Hours Cost Factor MHCF 0.33 1/hours 
Average Ship Cost Factor For Maintenance ASFCM 0.01 1/$ 
Total Maintenance Cost CMTC 5314.43 M$ 
    
Energy    
Fuel Cost CFUEL 1.15 $/gal 
Fuel Rate FRATE 6.40 lton/hr 
Fuel Conversion FCONV 6.80 lb/gal 
Total Fuel Cost CNRG 1959.96 M$ 
    
Replenishment Spares    
Replenishment Spares Cost CREP 5721.70 M$ 
    
Major Support (COH, ROH)    
Major Support Factor 1 MSF1 698.00  
Major Support Factor 2 MSF2 5.99  
Major Support Operating Hours Cost Factor MSOHF 10.36  
Average Ship Cost Factor ASCF 0.00  
Cost of Major Support CMSP 2008.58 M$ 
    
Total Operating and Support Cost COAS 21917.12 M$ 
    




Description Variable Value Units 
Residual Value Cost Factor RVCF 0.50  
Residual Value RES 555.50 M$ 
    
Total Program    
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